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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On June 29, 2015, in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent 
Redistricting Commission, the Supreme Court of the United States upheld 
Proposition 106, a ballot measure transferring the power to draw Arizona’s 
congressional districts from the Arizona Legislature to an independent 
redistricting commission (IRC).1  Though they vary widely in the details of 
both their form and function, at their core IRCs are bodies of people, none of 
whom are legislators, who are appointed to determine the boundaries of the 
electoral districts in a given area.2  Proposition 106 was adopted directly by 
the Arizona voters in 2000 in an attempt to “end[ ] the practice of 
gerrymandering and improv[e] voter and candidate participation in 
elections.”3  The Arizona Legislature challenged the initiative by claiming 
that it violated the mandate of the Elections Clause of the U.S. Constitution 
that the “Times, Places and Manner” of conducting federal congressional 
elections be “prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof.”4  A 
majority of the Court held, however, that in the context of the Election 
Clause the word “legislature” was not so narrow, and could encompass an 
IRC whose existence had been ordained by a direct referendum in 
accordance with the laws of that state.5 
The majority in Arizona State Legislature referred to Proposition 106 as 
“an endeavor by Arizona voters to address the problem of partisan 
gerrymandering” and opined that the use of IRCs like the Arizona 
Independent Redistricting Commission “impede[s] legislators from choosing 
their voters instead of facilitating the voters’ choice of their 
representatives.”6  Analysts have taken a similarly rosy view and praised the 
Court’s decision, seeing it as a step on the road to the end of political 
gerrymandering and underrepresentation of minority political parties.7  
                                                                                                                   
 1 Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658–59 
(2015). 
 2 Lillian V. Smith, Note, Recreating the “Ritual Carving”: Why Congress Should Fund 
Independent Redistricting Commissions and End Partisan Gerrymandering, 80 BROOK. L. 
REV. 1641, 1656–58 (2015). 
 3 Arizona, 135 S. Ct. at 2658. 
 4 U.S. CONST. art.  I, § 4, cl. 1 (emphasis added). 
 5 Arizona, 135 S. Ct. at 2671–72. 
 6 Id. at 2658, 2676. 
 7 See, e.g., Thomas E. Mann, Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting 
Commission et al., BROOKINGS INSTITUTION: FIX.GOV (June 29, 2015, 1:45 PM), http://www. 
brookings.edu/blogs/fixgov/posts/2015/06/29-arizona-redistricting-commission-mann (claiming 
that the Arizona decision “strengthens the legitimacy” of our government “by reinforcing the 
essential link between republican government and popular sovereignty”); Sean J. Young, The 
Supreme Court Strikes a Blow Against Partisan Gerrymandering, ACLU.ORG: SPEAK FREELY 
(July 1, 2015, 11:00 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/speak-freely/supreme-court-strikes-blow-
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Other countries that use IRCs have not had such positive results with 
them, however.  Optimistic U.S. projections often fail to consider data from 
these foreign systems, where so-called independent districting has been 
conducted for years in attempts to reduce partisanship and other forms of 
gerrymandering.  When analyzed, this information does not suggest that 
IRCs have any substantial impact on electoral partisanship or proportionality.  
Instead, the data seems to support the idea that “on some level all districting 
is gerrymandering,”8 no matter who draws the lines. 
This Note takes a comparative approach to assessing the value of IRCs in 
promoting proportionality and ending partisan bias by looking at four 
democratic countries that use both IRCs and “first-past-the-post” electoral 
systems with additional characteristics similar to those of the United States 
and analyzing their outcomes under several criteria for electoral equality.  
Because the focus of this work is on apportionment, and because the function 
and mode of election of the executive vary considerably among different 
countries, this analysis will exclusively focus on electoral policy with respect 
to legislative elections.  This Note also develops recommendations for U.S. 
electoral policy with respect to IRCs.  Finally, as very little comparative 
scholarship on redistricting has been done in the international field,9 this 
Note aims to help address that deficiency with a systematic inquiry into and 
comparison of the mechanisms of district delimitation in four different 
countries. 
This Note argues that IRCs are, at best, irrelevant to the incidence of 
partisan gerrymandering, and at their worst they may actually hinder the 
process of reducing partisan malapportionment.  Through original electoral 
analysis, this Note demonstrates that IRCs have been unable to bring rates of 
partisan disproportionality in seat distribution in the studied countries to low 
values, and that the rate in the U.S. is significantly lower than that in the 
studied countries.   
                                                                                                                   
against-partisan-gerrymandering (calling the decision a “victory” for both “democracy” and “the 
voters”). 
 8 Lani Guinier, Groups, Representation, and Race-Conscious Districting: A Case of the 
Emperor’s Clothes, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1589, 1615 (1993). 
 9 In the introduction to their book, Redistricting in Comparative Perspective, Bernard 
Grofman and Lisa Handley noted that, prior to their own collection of it, the “basic data on 
redistricting practices in democracies around the world” had never even been assembled, 
much less analyzed or commented on.  Introduction: Redistricting in Comparative 
Perspective, in REDISTRICTING IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 4, 4 (Lisa Handley & Bernie 
Grofman eds., 2008).  Five years later, in 2013, Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos reiterated 
concern about this “blind spot” in election law in his article, Our Electoral Exceptionalism, 80 
U.  CHI.  L.  REV.  769, 769 (2013), where he bemoaned the fact that “[s]cholars in the field 
have devoted almost no attention to how other countries organize their electoral systems.”  
The author’s own research confirms the persistence of this dearth of scholarship into the 
present day. 
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The remainder of this Note consists of three parts.  Part II provides 
background information on the electoral systems of the various countries 
analyzed, focusing on their systems of redistricting and apportionment.  The 
systems presently used in the United States are discussed first, in Section 
II.A, with analysis of both the federally established standards and the more 
idiosyncratic specific systems in place in the various states.  Section II.B 
discusses the methodology used to select the additional countries that appear 
in the analysis.  Finally, Section II.C provides an overview of the four 
countries to be compared—Bangladesh, Botswana, India, and Pakistan—and 
explains their respective electoral and districting systems.   
Part III assesses the representational outcomes of each of the countries 
described in the prior part by analyzing their respective abilities to remove 
partisanship from districting decisions and provide governmental 
representation to minority voices in meaningful ways.  The extent to which 
each country is able to meet these goals is evaluated both objectively—by 
using established indices for proportionality of representation, and 
subjectively by considering relevant contextual information that is unique to 
each particular country and the way it affects the actual independence of its 
IRC.  Various possible explanations for these results are discussed, along 
with their apparent probabilities. 
Finally, Part IV provides suggestions for the future of U.S. electoral 
policy based on these results and makes conclusions about the efficacy of 
IRCs with respect to the dual aims discussed in Part III. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  The Electoral System of the United States 
Unlike many democracies in the world, the United States does not use a 
“proportional representation” (PR) system for its legislative elections, opting 
instead for a single-member district system wherein the candidate who 
receives a plurality of the votes wins the entire district.10  Referred to as a 
“winner-takes-all,”11 “plurality-majority,”12 or “first-past-the-post”13  (FPTP) 
electoral system, this scheme disadvantages parties representing minor 
interests and people without broad national support and large reserves of 
                                                                                                                   
 10 BUREAU OF INT’L INFO. PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE USA ELECTIONS IN BRIEF 1, 12–13 
(George Clack et al. eds., 2007), http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/gpo57607/elections_brief.pdf. 
 11 Id. at 13. 
 12 Yen-Tu Su, Beyond Nightmare and Hope: Engineering Electoral Proportionality in 
Presidential Democracies, 30 J. LEGIS. 205, 211 (2004). 
 13 Oliver Hall, Death by a Thousand Signatures: The Rise of Restrictive Ballot Access Laws 
and the Decline of Electoral Competition in the United States, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 407, 
423 (2005). 
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wealth,14 as they are less likely to secure a plurality of the votes in any given 
district and will thus receive no representation no matter how sizeable a 
minority of the total population they might comprise.15  
The FPTP structure of the American electoral system makes redistricting 
a more controversial and influential process than it is in many other systems 
because the composition of districts is more outcome-determinative in 
single-member plurality elections than in those that take place in PR 
systems.16  The redistricting process in the United States is also somewhat 
unique in that it is simultaneously “decentralized, political, and often 
litigated.”17  It is decentralized because the bulk of the decisions, even with 
respect to federal elections, are left up to the states by the Elections Clause of 
the U.S. Constitution.18  Certain federal legislation and Supreme Court case 
law proscribes the boundaries within which those decisions must be made, 
however, and the often complex interactions between these bodies of law, 
coupled with the creation of explicit statutory causes of action for certain 
districting ills, has given rise to a higher-than-average rate of apportionment 
litigation.19  Finally, unlike in most modern democracies, the redistricting 
process in the majority of U.S. states is expressly political, with elected 
officials themselves controlling the process of determining the composition 
of their own respective electorates.20 
1.   Federal Regulation 
As discussed above, the Elections Clause of the U.S. Constitution leaves 
it to the states to determine the “Times, Places, and Manner” of conducting 
congressional elections as they see fit, and this includes the manner of 
redistricting their territory.21  These powers are not unlimited, however.  The 
Elections Clause also allows Congress to alter most state regulations at 
                                                                                                                   
 14 BUREAU OF INT’L INFO. PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 10, at 13. 
 15 Id. at 51. 
 16 See, e.g., Su, supra note 12, at 215–16 (observing that the homes of people of differing 
political parties, races, and affiliations with other special interest groups are not 
geographically distributed with statistical randomness, and it is thus difficult to define districts 
that divide them fairly); Guinier, supra note 8, at 1613 (noting that in single-member plurality 
systems—where the votes of members of the electorate who do not fall into the plurality are 
“wasted” rather than represented proportionately, and votes for the plurality choice above and 
beyond the precise number needed to achieve that plurality are “wasted” by failing to 
contribute to the election of any candidate—the redistricting process presents multiple 
avenues for disenfranchisement of particular groups). 
 17 Michael P. McDonald, United States Redistricting: A Comparative Look at the 50 States, 
in REDISTRICTING IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 9, at 55. 
 18 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
 19 McDonald, supra note 17. 
 20 Id. 
 21 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
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will,22 and though the Supreme Court’s general attitude towards state 
redistricting plans is one of deference, it has altered that approach in cases 
where it has perceived that a prima facie case has been made for the violation 
of constitutional norms like racial or population equality.23 
Those two areas of stricter scrutiny, were not chosen randomly.  The first 
is mandated by the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which is violated if members 
of a given race “have less opportunity than other members of the electorate 
to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their 
choice.”24  The second is governed by the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Wesberry v. Sanders, which held that single-member districts must each 
contain roughly the same number of people so that “as nearly as is 
practicable one man’s vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much 
as another’s.”25  This rule is popularly known as “one-person, one-vote,”26 
and its narrow construction has meant that the equal population requirement 
for districting is enforced more strictly for U.S. Congressional Districts than 
it is anywhere else in the world.27 
Though the Supreme Court has often enforced these rules in order to 
provide remedies for racial gerrymandering and vote-dilution for voters from 
improperly drawn districts, it has not yet been willing to allow a remedy for 
partisan gerrymandering.  In Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 267 (2004) the 
Court heard a case challenging a Pennsylvania districting plan on just those 
grounds.  In this case, the majority found that no relief could be granted to 
the plaintiff, as the Court could identify no standards to define either the 
appropriate makeup of a politically “neutral” districting plan or the limits of 
judicial intervention in this area.28  In his decisive opinion concurring in the 
judgment only, however, Justice Kennedy left open the possibility that some 
later Court could agree upon some “limited and precise rationale[s]” that 
could provide those missing standards and empower the Court to adjudicate 
cases like this in the future.29 
                                                                                                                   
 22 Id. 
 23 See, e.g., Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 91 (1997); Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 
740 (1983). 
 24 Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 U.S.C.S. § 10301 (LexisNexis 2015). 
 25 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1964). 
 26 See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Answering Questions, Questioning Answers, and the Role of 
Empiricism in the Law of Democracy, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1269, 1273 (2013). 
 27 Stephanopoulos, supra note 9, at 806. 
 28 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267,  
 29 Id. at 305–07 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (concurring). 
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2.  State Regulation 
Though federal law provides some guidelines that must be met by 
redistricting plans, it leaves the specifics of any such plan to the states.  This 
lack of centralized control means that a variety of approaches to redistricting 
have been adopted across the country, both at the congressional and the state 
legislative levels.  In broad strokes, these various methods fall into one of 
two categories: those that use the standard legislative process and those that 
use appointed commissions of some kind, a small number of which are 
IRCs.30 
At the congressional level, only four states currently use truly 
independent redistricting commissions to draw their district lines.31  Two 
states use what are termed “politician commissions,” wherein elected 
officials are allowed to hold seats,32 while six states use mere “advisory 
commissions” whose recommended districting schemes are not binding on 
the ultimate decision of the legislature, 33 and two additional states use 
“backup commissions” who are only called upon if certain conditions, 
indicating that the legislature has failed to enact a proper redistricting plan, 
occur.34  For seven more states, the question of redistricting is not a relevant 
one at the congressional level, as federal apportionment of congressional 
seats has only granted them each one.35  The remaining twenty-nine states do 
not use any form of redistricting commission to draw their congressional 
districts, leaving those decisions entirely within the purview of the 
legislature.36 
When states allow some amount of control over their redistricting plans to 
be vested in the legislature, it is the state legislature that has that power.  This 
may help to explain why the prevalence of redistricting by commission, 
rather than exclusively by legislature, is somewhat higher at the state 
legislative level than it is at the federal congressional level.  Though there are 
moderately more truly independent redistricting commissions for state 
                                                                                                                   
 30 McDonald, supra note 17, at 56. 
 31 Justin Levitt, Who Draws the Lines?: Institution: Congress, LOYOLA LAW SCHOOL: ALL 
ABOUT REDISTRICTING: PROFESSOR JUSTIN LEVITT’S GUIDE TO DRAWING THE ELECTORAL 
LINES, http://redistricting.lls.edu/who.php (last visited Oct. 7, 2015) (showing on a map that 
Arizona, California, Idaho, and Washington—and only these states—use independent 
commissions to draw their congressional district lines). 
 32 Id. (Hawaii and New Jersey). 
 33 Id. (Iowa, Maine, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, and Virginia). 
 34 Id. (Connecticut and Indiana). 
 35 Id. (Alaska, Delaware, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming). 
 36 Id. (Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Massachusetts, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, North 
Carolina, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin). 
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legislatures than there are for the federal Congress—six, rather than four37—
both the numbers of states with politician commissions38 and with backup 
commissions39 each increase to seven from two if state rather than federal 
legislative districts are examined.  The number of states with advisory 
commissions holds steady at six with the move from federal to state,40 but 
overall there is an increase in the number of states using redistricting 
commissions in some capacity,41 and only twenty-four states leave entirely to 
the state legislatures the designing of their own districts.42 
Differences in the processes of redistricting are not meaningless, but all 
have seemed to lead to malapportioned results.  A study conducted by 
Michael P. McDonald of George Mason University during the early 2000s 
suggested that the outcome of a given district’s election could be determined 
from its electoral structure roughly 89% of the time.43  The study found that 
nearly all U.S. districts at both the congressional and state legislative levels 
constituted either partisan or incumbent gerrymanders.44  Partisan 
gerrymanders largely appeared where redistricting was conducted either by 
the legislature—and one party controlled that legislature—or by politician 
commissions or otherwise partisan commissions.45  On the other hand, 
incumbent gerrymanders, districts that favored the party that was currently in 
power regardless of its identity, predominated in districts with bipartisan 
commissions or divided legislatures that controlled the process, where 
compromise between the parties was often required to pass a plan and 
generally led to a free-for-all approach allowing each house of the legislature 
to district for itself and privilege its own incumbency.46 
Though the difference between bipartisan control and partisan monopoly 
over the electoral system seem meaningful in the context of redistricting, not 
all differences seem to affect outcomes.  The choice between control by 
                                                                                                                   
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. (Arkansas, Colorado, Hawaii, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, and Pennsylvania). 
 39 Id. (Connecticut, Illinois, Maryland, Mississippi, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Texas). 
 40 Id. (Iowa, Maine, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Virginia). 
 41 The total is up to twenty-six, from fourteen at the congressional level.  This increase 
remains substantial even if we remove the seven states (mentioned supra note 35) who only 
have one Congressional District and thus have no districting plan at the congressional level.  
Subtracting the three of those states (Alaska, Montana, and Vermont) that use redistricting 
commissions at the state level still leaves a 64% increase, from fourteen to twenty-three.  See 
id.; Levitt, supra note 31. 
 42 Levitt, supra note 31 (Alabama, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New 
Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, West 
Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming). 
 43 McDonald, supra note 9, at 61–65. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. at 66. 
 46 Id. at 66–67. 
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legislature and control by commission, for instance, does not seem to have a 
notable impact on the predictability of election outcomes as recorded by this 
study.  Of the ten districts with unpredictable results, only four used any sort 
of commission in their districting process, and all other districts that used 
commissions faired just as poorly, in terms of competitive elections, as 
legislated districts.47  Despite this observation, the use of redistricting 
commissions, independent or otherwise, has increased noticeably since this 
study was completed—rising from twenty to twenty-four at the state 
legislative level and from ten to fifteen at the congressional.48 
McDonald’s study does not assess the partisan proportionality of the 
outcomes of the elections.  To do so would have required a structured 
mathematical analysis of the total number of votes cast by each political 
party and the number of seats that each party obtained for comparison 
between entities that use IRCs and those that do not.49  This Note conducts 
such an analysis on four FPTP countries with IRCs at the national level. 
B.  Foreign Electoral Systems 
In selecting countries for comparison, this Note has adopted Ran 
Hirschl’s “most similar cases” method,50 and every effort has been made to 
select countries for comparison to the United States “that have similar 
characteristics” to its electoral system.51  Unfortunately, due to the relatively 
idiosyncratic nature and low total number of electoral systems in the world, it 
was not possible to choose only countries “that are matched on all variables 
or potential explanations that are not central to the study,” varying only in 
whether or not they use IRCs—as is Hirschl’s ideal recommendation for the 
“most similar cases” method—but many significant similarities have been 
ensured among all of the target countries, so there will at least be fewer 
possible explanations for the observed outcomes.52 
                                                                                                                   
 47 Id. at 61–67. 
 48 See id.; Levitt, supra note 31. 
 49 See the various methods of assessing disproportionality in electoral systems that are 
discussed in part III infra. 
 50 See Ran Hirschl, The Question of Case Selection in Comparative Constitutional Law, 53 
AM. J. COMP. L. 125, 126 (2005).  In his article about case-selection, Ran Hirschl suggests that 
there are five basic methodologies for deciding which particular items to bring into a 
comparative law analysis: (1) the “most similar cases” method; (2) the “most different cases” 
method; (3) the “prototypical cases” method; (4) the “most difficult cases” method; and (5) 
the “outlier cases” method.  Though this analysis is geared towards the selection of actual 
court-cases, its principles apply equally to any study wherein a selection of a small number of 
items must be selected for comparison from a multitude. 
 51 Id. at 134. 
 52 Id. 
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With this methodology in mind, countries were chosen for comparison in 
this Note by eliminating all nations that did not conform to the following 
parameters: (1) an FPTP electoral system, (2) the use of at least two of the 
same criteria used in the United States to draw district boundaries,53 (3) the 
use of an IRC to draw district boundaries, and (4) the reasonable 
independence of that IRC from both the legislature and the relevant political 
parties.54  No further criteria for selection were needed or desired, as these 
criteria alone brought the number of available countries down to a mere five.  
Of those five, four—Bangladesh, Botswana, India, and Pakistan—have been 
used in this analysis.55 
1.  Bangladesh 
The People’s Republic of Bangladesh proclaimed independence from 
Pakistan in 197156 and became a parliamentary democracy under its new 
constitution in 1972.57  The Bangladeshi legislature, the Jatiya Sangsad, is 
unicameral and has 350 seats, 300 of which are filled by popular election 
every five years and the remaining fifty of which are reserved for women and 
filled by the vote of the members of parliament.58 
Elections are conducted by the Election Commission of Bangladesh 
(ECB), an organization ordained by the Bangladeshi constitution to preside 
over all the country’s elections.59  Comprised of an indeterminate number of 
commissioners who are appointed by the president of the country and serve 
five-year terms, the express functions of the ECB are to prepare election 
                                                                                                                   
 53 See Lisa Handley & Bernard Grofman, Criteria Considered in the Delimitation Process, 
in REDISTRICTING IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 9, at 297, 305 app. C (noting that 
the U.S. redistricting criteria are (1) “population equality,” (2) compactness, (3) “respect for 
local administrative boundaries,” and (4) “communities of interest”). 
 54 Kenya, Tanzania, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines were all excluded on these grounds 
alone.  See Lisa Handley, A Comparative Survey of Structures and Criteria, in REDISTRICTING 
IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 9, at 265, 269 (noting that the IRCs in Kenya and 
Tanzania are not “quite independent” of the legislatures in those countries, and that the IRC in 
St. Vincent actually includes political representatives). 
 55 The fifth country, Yemen, has been excluded from this analysis due to the complete 
collapse of its government in January of 2015.  Though this Note only discusses past elections 
and would not, therefore, have been negatively affected by this change in current events, the 
academic value of an analysis of Yemen’s electoral system would be severely limited by that 
system’s expiration.  See, e.g., Shuaib Almosawa & Rod Nordland, U.S. Fears Chaos as 
Government of Yemen Falls, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/ 
23/world/middleeast/yemen-houthi-crisis-sana.html?_r=0. 
 56 COUNTRYWATCH, BANGLADESH REVIEW 2015, at 9 (Denise Youngblood Coleman ed., 
2015). 
 57 Id. at 10. 
 58 The PRS Group, Inc., Bangladesh Country Conditions, in POLITICAL RISK YEARBOOK: 
BANGLADESH COUNTRY REPORT 2015, at 12 (2014). 
 59 BANGL. CONST., Nov. 4, 1972, arts. 118–19. 
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rolls, hold elections, and delimit the country’s constituencies.60  The ECB 
thus serves, among its other functions, as Bangladesh’s IRC. 
The specifics of how redistricting is conducted in Bangladesh are laid out 
by statute, but they are neither demanding nor precise.  Delimitation is 
required to occur after each census is completed and before each 
parliamentary general election, but the ECB may avoid the process on the 
latter occasion if it specifies in writing beforehand that it wishes to do so.61  
When the process does occur, there are few formal criteria to determine how 
exactly the lines should be drawn.  Districts must each be single-member, but 
the other two parameters, compactness and “due regard . . . to the distribution 
of population,” each only apply if they comport with the ambiguously stated 
needs of “administrative convenience.”62   
It is perhaps especially surprising that the population-based requirements 
are not more demanding.  The Bangladeshi statute requires only that “due 
regard” be given to population, but does not specify what form this regard 
should take—equality among constituencies, etc.—and further qualifies this 
requirement with the note that such regard need only be paid “so far as is 
practicable.”63  This stands in sharp contrast with the redistricting criteria of 
many nations, which create strict requirements or strong suggestions for 
equal population.64 
Once it has made its decisions about the delimitation, the ECB must 
publish a preliminary report of its boundary designations and entertain public 
comments on the report for a defined and announced period of its choosing.65  
The ECB itself then decides whether or not to make changes as a result of 
this input, and no other form of appeal is authorized.66  In this, as in all other 
matters under its purview, the ECB’s powers are plenary within its sphere 
and unchecked by any authority apart from the Bangladeshi Constitution and 
relevant statutes.67 
Political circumstances in Bangladesh have grown very dysfunctional 
over the past two years. The most recent election, in 2014, was marred by 
massive unrest, party boycotting, and corruption to such an extent that the 
general global consensus is that its results are in no way representative of the 
                                                                                                                   
 60 Id. 
 61 Delimitation of Constituencies Ordinance, BANGL. CODE vol. 19, act 15, § 8 (1976) 
(amended 1978). 
 62 Id. §§ 6(1)–6(2). 
 63 Id. § 6(2). 
 64 See infra text accompanying notes 91, 115, 133. 
 65 BANGL. CODE vol. 19, act 15 § 6(3). 
 66 Id. § 6(4). 
 67 BANGL. CONST., Nov. 4, 1972, art. 118(4). 
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wishes of the people.68  For the purposes of this study, that election is not, 
therefore, seen to be a good example by which to measure the system in 
general.  Therefore, despite the fact that the most recent electoral data is used 
for all the other countries surveyed, the two elections preceding the most 
recent are used in the case of Bangladesh. 
2.  Botswana 
Since attaining its independence in 1966, Botswana has been a politically 
stable69 multiparty democracy with one of the best records for human rights 
of any country in the developing world.70  It is Africa’s longest-running 
democracy, and it has a stellar rating for “good governance.”71  Voter 
participation is also very high in Botswana, as it enjoys universal suffrage for 
all citizens over eighteen72 and the turnout rate among registered voters at the 
2009 legislative election was over 75%.73 
The Botswanan legislature is bicameral and consists of the House of 
Chiefs—a largely advisory house whose members are all either indirectly 
elected or appointed by the President—and a National Assembly with sixty-
three seats—of which fifty-seven are filled by members elected directly by 
popular vote, four are filled with appointees selected by the majority party, 
and two are saved for the President and the Attorney-General.74  Despite 
elections that are widely held to have been conducted “freely and fairly,”75 
only one of Botswana’s several major political parties, the Botswana 
Democratic Party (BDP), has ever controlled its government, having won 
every election in the country since its independence.76 
The political districts in Botswana are drawn by an IRC, as has been 
required by the country’s constitution since its inception.77  This group, 
                                                                                                                   
 68 See, e.g., Marie Horf, Parliamentary Elections in Bangladesh, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/01/219331.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2014) (“With 
more than half of the seats uncontested and most of the remainder offering only token 
opposition, the results of the just-concluded elections do not appear to credibly express the 
will of the Bangladeshi people.”); Bangladesh, THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE, 
https://www.ndi.org/bangladesh (last visited Nov. 27, 2015). 
 69 COUNTRYWATCH, BOTSWANA REVIEW 2015, at 8 (Denise Youngblood Coleman, ed., 2015). 
 70 Id. at 44. 
 71 Id. at 12.  The CountryWatch report notes that Botswana ranked number one in the 
World Economic Forum’s “good governance” index in 2003.  The list considered “rule of law, 
corruption,” “enforcement of contracts,” and “evaluations from business leaders” to determine 
its rankings.  Id. at 10. 
 72 Id. at 51. 
 73 Id. at 14. 
 74 Id. at 14. 
 75 Id. at 8. 
 76 Id. at 13. 
 77 BOTS. CONST., Sept. 30, 1966, §§ 64–65. 
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called a Delimitation Commission, is composed of between one and five 
members who are hand-selected by Botswana’s Judicial Service Commission 
(JSC),78 a standing committee that is also charged with appointing the 
members of Botswana’s Independent Electoral Commission79 and most of 
the judges of both the High Court80 and the Court of Appeals.81  The JSC is a 
six-member commission composed of the Chief Justice of the High Court, 
the President of the Court of Appeal, the Attorney-General, the Chairman of 
the Public Service Commission, a member of the Law Society, and a special 
appointee from outside the legal profession.82  On its face, therefore, the 
formation of a Delimitation Commission seems to be fully insulated from the 
influence of the legislature.  Closer inspection, however, reveals that this 
separation is not quite so complete, as four of the six members of the JSC are 
appointed to their respective positions by the Botswanan President,83 who is 
himself elected by the National Assembly.84 
The rules governing the qualifications for appointment to a Delimitation 
Commission also reflect an apparently sincere attempt to put the district-
drawing process out of the political sphere.  A Delimitation Commission is 
not a standing committee; instead, one is convened only as needed to redraw 
boundaries and is dissolved immediately after it fulfills its function.85  
Further, the Constitution mandates that this be at least every ten years but no 
more frequently than every five years.86  Each time a commission is 
established, the JSC is also required to follow very specific guidelines as to 
whom it chooses to appoint.  No one can be chosen to serve on a commission 
who is a Member of the National Assembly, who is a public officer, or who 
“is or has been within the preceding five years actively engaged in 
politics.”87  The Constitution even goes so far as to define what it means to 
                                                                                                                   
 78 Id. § 64(1). 
 79 Id. § 65A(1). 
 80 Id. § 96(2). 
 81 Id. § 100(2). 
 82 Id. § 103(1). 
 83 Section 96(1) of the Botswanan Constitution provides that the Chief Justice of the High 
Court is to be appointed by the President, and § 100(1) says the same of the President of the 
Court of Appeal.  The Chairman of the Public Service Commission, like all of the members of 
that body, is likewise selected by the President, per § 109(2).  Finally, the non-legal appointee 
to the JSC is explicitly selected by the President as well, under the authority of § 103(1)(f).  
Of the members of the JSC, therefore, only the Attorney General and the representative from 
the Law Society are not Presidential appointees. 
 84 BOTS. CONST., supra note 77, § 32. 
 85 Id. § 65(8). 
 86 Id. § 64(1).  A Delimitation Commission can be convened even within five years of the 
most recent one, however, to respond in a timely fashion to either an act of parliament 
changing the number of seats in the National Assembly or a newly conducted nationwide 
population census.  Id. § 64(2). 
 87 Id. § 64(4). 
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be “actively engaged in politics,” providing that this requirement disqualifies 
any people who have been Members of the National Assembly, candidates 
for the National Assembly, or officers of organizations that support or have 
supported a candidate for the National Assembly.88  All of these restrictions 
also apply to the person who is chosen to be the Chairman of each 
Delimitation Commission, who is additionally required to have, at some 
point, held a high judicial office.89 
Once it has been convened, a Delimitation Commission is charged with 
generating, “as soon as [is] practicable,” a report for the President  that 
indicates whether or not the district lines need to be changed and, if they do, 
in what way they should be altered.90  In considering whether or not the 
boundaries must be redrawn, the Delimitation Commission will look at six 
factors: equality of population, “natural community of interest, means of 
communication, geographical features, density of population, and the 
boundaries of Tribal Territories and administrative districts.”91  Equal 
population is the default consideration, eclipsed only in case of conflict with 
one of the other five factors.92  Additionally, unlike some other countries,93  
Botswana requires that the total population inhabiting the country be used to 
determine whether or not an equal division of the population has been placed 
in each district.94 
This report is binding; the Delimitation Commission presents it to the 
President, who then enacts its proposals as presented, without alteration or 
addition.95  This is consistent with the fact that a Delimitation Commission, 
when it is acting within the scope of its constitutionally ordained powers, is 
not “subject to the direction or control of any other person or authority.”96  In 
this way, Botswana’s Delimitation Commissions act as truly independent 
IRCs. 
                                                                                                                   
 88 Id. § 64(5). 
 89 Id. § 64(3). 
 90 Id. § 65(1). 
 91 Id. § 65(2). 
 92 Id. 
 93 See Lisa Handley & Bernard Grofman, Criteria Considered in the Delimitation Process, 
in REDISTRICTING IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 9, at 297, 297–305 app. C 
(showing that, of the sixty relevant countries surveyed, only thirty-one used their total 
populations when calculating population equality in districts, other countries used different 
figures, like number of registered voters or citizens). 
 94 BOTS. CONST., supra note 77, § 65(3). 
 95 Id. § 65(4). 
 96 Id. § 65(7). 
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3.  India 
In 2009, over 417 million voters cast their ballots in the parliamentary 
elections in India, and that was only 58% of the total electorate.97  Numbers 
like these make India the largest democracy in the world, with over three-
times the voter pool of its nearest competitor, the United States.98  Like the 
United States, India operates under a federal system with an independent 
judiciary, an executive appointed by electoral college, and a bicameral 
legislature.99  Both the upper chamber of the Indian Parliament, the Rajya 
Sabha, and the president are elected through the single-transferrable vote 
system,100 but the lower chamber, the Lok Sabha, uses a first-past-the-post 
system.101  This analysis will therefore focus on the workings of the Lok 
Sabha, as it is the chamber that is most similar to the systems of the other 
countries studied here. 
Formally independent from Great Britain since 1947, India has enjoyed 
universal adult suffrage ever since the enactment of its constitution in 
1950.102  Among its many provisions, the Constitution of India provides for 
an Election Commission (EC) that is fully independent of the legislature.103  
The EC is charged with the “superintendence, direction and control of the 
preparation of the electoral rolls for, and the conduct of, all elections” at both 
the national and state levels.104  The members of the EC are appointed by the 
Indian President and not the legislature,105 and it was hoped when it was 
established that the EC would thus “stand[ ] ‘apart’ from the government and 
‘above’ everyday politics,” insulated from the “intense local pressures 
shaping Indian politics.”106  To this end, Article 329 of the Constitution also 
                                                                                                                   
 97 David Gilmartin & Robert Moog, Introduction to “Election Law in India,” 11 ELECTION 
L.J. 136, 136 (2012). 
 98 Id. 
 99 Amanda Kelley Myers, Comment, Importing Democracy: Can Lessons Learned from 
Germany, India, and Australia Help Reform the American Electoral System?, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 
1113, 1144–45 (2010). 
 100 An electoral system wherein, instead of making individual selections, voters rank all or 
some of the candidates on a ballot in order of their preference.  Then, if the voters’ first-choice 
candidates do not win a majority, their votes are applied in support of their second-choice 
candidates, and so on down to the last candidate they ranked if need be.  It is often praised for 
“wasting” fewer votes that FPTP systems do, but it is criticized for its “arbitrariness” and its 
tendency to produce strange outcomes—like candidates who become less electorally 
successful after achieving greater support.  Daniel R. Ortiz, Note, Alternative Voting Systems 
as Remedies for Unlawful At-Large Systems, 92 YALE L.J. 144, 150–51 (1982). 
 101 Myers, supra note 99, at 1145. 
 102 Gilmartin & Moog, supra note 97, at 137. 
 103 INDIA CONST., art. 324.  
 104 Id. § 1. 
 105 Id. § 2. 
 106 Gilmartin & Moog, supra note 97, at 137–38. 
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provides that decisions made regarding delimitation of districts or allotment 
of seats thereto cannot be “called into question” by the judiciary.107 
The decision to conduct redistricting at all, however, is made by the 
Parliament, which is vested with the sole authority to appoint periodic IRCs, 
called Delimitation Commissions, for that purpose.108  All four of the 
Delimitation Commissions that have been appointed thus far have consisted 
of three members, one of whom has always been the Chief Election 
Commissioner, ex officio,109 but this is not a requirement, and the EC is not 
officially responsible for legislative redistricting.  The Parliament is granted 
vague blanket powers with respect to redistricting by Article 327 of the 
Constitution.  “[F]rom time to time,” it is allowed to “by law make provision 
with respect to all matters relating to, or in connection with, elections to 
either House of Parliament or to the House or either House of the Legislature 
of a State” in order to “secur[e] the due constitution of such House or 
Houses”—a power that expressly can be used to affect the “delimitation of 
constituencies.”110  All of this means that although India’s redistricting 
process appears to be fully independent of its political process, it, like the 
processes of all of the countries here studied, still maintains definite 
openings for possible partisan influence.111 
The fact that Article 329 of the Constitution renders delimitation 
decisions nonjusticiable, also makes this possible influence all the more 
dangerous by keeping it out of reach of the ordinary checks on political 
decisions.112  Although redistricting orders cannot be directly attacked in the 
courts, the law does allow for the judicial enforcement of the bar against 
“corruption,” as defined by the specific provisions of the Representation of 
the People Acts,113 through the filing of post-election petitions, and these can 
address conduct at any phase of the electoral process.114 
Even without flagrant corruption or other illegal acts, however, there are 
elements of the delimitation system that allow for the possibility of 
dangerous manipulations of the redistricting process.  The criteria that any 
given Delimitation Commission is bound to use to draw district boundary 
                                                                                                                   
 107 INDIA CONST., art. 329, § a.  
 108 Gilmartin & Moog, supra note 97, at 137–38. 
 109 See Delimitation Commission Act (Act No. 81/1952) (India); Delimitation Commission 
Act (Act No. 61/1962) (India); Delimitation Commission Act (Act No. 76/1972) (India); 
Delimitation Commission Act (Act No. 33/2002) (India). 
 110 INDIA CONST., art. 327. 
 111 See Alistair McMillan, Delimitation in India, in REDISTRICTING IN COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE, supra note 9, at 75–76 (noting that the role of the Indian Parliament in the 
country’s delimitation process left the system “vulnerable to political interference and 
accusations of partiality”). 
 112 Id. at 82. 
 113 Representation of the People Act, Act No. 43/1951, § 123 (India). 
 114 Gilmartin & Moog, supra note 97, at 139. 
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lines are set out by its corresponding Delimitation Act, as passed by 
Parliament.  Since 1962, every Delimitation Act has mandated the drawing 
of single-member districts based primarily on the idea of population equality 
as derived from the census figures.115  This requirement, however, has also 
been consistently supplemented with others.  In addition to being equal in 
population, constituencies must also be “geographically compact,” and care 
must be taken to observe the reasonable lines suggested by “physical 
features, existing boundaries of administrative units, facilities of 
communication and public convenience.”116  Additionally, each assembly 
district must fall wholly within a single parliamentary district, and there are 
detailed special rules for the districts that are to contain one of the seats that 
are “reserved” for members of otherwise disadvantaged and disenfranchised 
castes and tribal groups: the “Scheduled Castes” and “Scheduled Tribes.”117  
Unfortunately, while there are good reasons for each of these criteria 
individually, in the aggregate they often contradict each other, which 
provides ample plausible justifications for districting plans that are actually 
gerrymanders.118 
In attempting to draw districts with equal populations, India ostensibly 
considers the total inhabiting population of the relevant regions rather than a 
specific subset thereof.119  To further complicate its electoral system, 
however, rapid and uneven population growth across India during the mid-
twentieth century led the Parliament to freeze all redistricting for the Lok 
Sabha for thirty years, as they feared a redistribution of power between the 
states.120  Even when redistricting finally resumed, it was decided that 
current census data would not be used.  As a result, the last Delimitation 
Commission, which convened in 2002, used population figures from the 
1971 census to make its determinations.121  It was also decided at about that 
time that no delimitation would occur again until the next census after 2026, 
                                                                                                                   
 115 Delimitation Commission Act, 1962, No. 61, Acts of Parliament (India), § 9(I); 
Delimitation Commission Act, 1972, No. 76, Acts of Parliament (India), § 9(1); Delimitation 
Commission Act, 2002, No. 33, Acts of Parliament (India), § 9(1). 
 116 Delimitation Commission Act, 1962, No. 61, Acts of Parliament (India), § 9(I)(a); 
Delimitation Commission Act, 1972, No. 76, Acts of Parliament (India), § 9(1)(a); 
Delimitation Commission Act, 2002, No. 33, Acts of Parliament (India), § 9(1)(a). 
 117 Delimitation Commission Act, 1962, No. 61, Acts of Parliament (India), § 9(I)(b)–(d); 
Delimitation Commission Act, 1972, No. 76, Acts of Parliament (India), § 9(1)(a), (b)–(d); 
Delimitation Commission Act, 2002, No. 33, Acts of Parliament (India), § 9(1)(a), (b)–(d). 
 118 See McMillan, supra note 111, at 79–82 (noting that “with conflicting criteria, just about 
any outcome can be justified” in redistricting). 
 119 Handley & Grofman, supra note 93. 
 120 Id. at 75. 
 121 See Delimitation Commission Act, 2002, No. 33, Acts of Parliament (India), § 4(1). 
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and the Constitution was amended to reflect this.122  The stated reason for 
these changes was that it would not be fair or wise to allow the balance of 
power to shift in favor of the regions that have not complied with national 
mandates for deceleration of population growth.123  In his study of 
delimitation in India, however, Alistair McMillan, found this to be nothing 
more than a “smokescreen” for purely political motives involving the 
balance of power between the northern and southern regions.124 
4.  Pakistan 
In 1947, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan achieved both independence 
from the United Kingdom and territorial separation from the new nation of 
India, to establish itself as a mixed presidential-parliamentary democracy.125  
Its legislature is a bicameral parliament called the Majlis-e-Shura consisting 
of an indirectly elected Senate and a 342-seat National Assembly, 272 of 
whose members are elected by popular vote every five years.126  Elections to 
the National Assembly are performed with an FPTP system, and the 
franchise is extended to all adults.127  This study focuses on National 
Assembly elections, as they bear the most similarity to the selected elections 
in the other countries discussed. 
The country’s elections are presided over by a constitutionally mandated 
body called the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP).128  This 
theoretically independent body is composed of commissioners who are 
required to be former high court judges and who are appointed either directly 
by the president or by the prime minister and an explicitly multi-partisan 
parliamentary committee.129  Despite these apparent safeguards for the 
                                                                                                                   
 122 INDIA CONST., art. 82, amended by The Constitution (Eighty-fourth Amendment) Act, 
2001. 
 123 McMillan, supra note 111, at 87. 
 124 Id. at 87–88.  McMillan expresses a high level of incredulity and disdain for this 
supposed motive, asserting that it is “clearly indefensible” to “deny a person an equal voice in 
the democratic process because they happen to be living in a State that has had a high-
population growth rate.”  He also points out that the connection between the population policy 
and the allocation of Lok Sabha seats is far too tenuous to be effectual, and that it fails to take 
into account or provide a remedy for shifts in comparative regional populations that occur as a 
result of the migration of existing members of the population rather than the births of new 
ones. 
 125 COUNTRYWATCH, PAKISTAN REVIEW 2015, at 11, 172 (Denise Youngblood Coleman ed., 
2015). 
 126 Id. at 173. 
 127 Mohammed Waseem, Elections, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO PAKISTANI HISTORY 147, 
149 (Ayesha Jalal ed., 2012).  
 128 Id. at 146–47. 
 129 PAKISTAN CONST. art. 213, §§ 1–2(B). 
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political independence of the ECP, it is widely believed to be a corrupt 
organization, rife with cronyism and possibly guilty of rigging elections.130 
It is this body that also serves as Pakistan’s IRC.  After each census, the 
ECP first allocates the seats in the National Assembly among the six 
provincial areas of Pakistan.131  It then conducts the process of delimitation, 
dividing each province into a number of constituencies equal to the number 
of seats that have been allocated to it.132  In performing its redistricting 
function, the ECP uses discrete criteria defined by statute.  The various 
constituencies must first and foremost be equal in population, but within that 
parameter four other factors are also considered: geographical compactness, 
administrative boundaries, communication and “public convenience,” and 
“other cognate factors to ensure homogeneity.”133 
The ECP’s delimitation powers are plenary.  It officially publishes its 
decisions without need for approval from any governing body, and although 
it is required to “hear” complaints from any eligible voters who take issue 
with its preliminary redistricting scheme, the commission is under no 
obligation to act on these citizen complaints, and appeal to a third-party for 
intercession on these matters is not available.134 
III.  ANALYZING THE PROPORTIONALITY OF ELECTORAL OUTCOMES 
Though FPTP democracies are, by definition, not proportional 
representation (PR) systems, they are still concerned with representation that 
is proportional.135  Some systems, like the one in the United States,136 
                                                                                                                   
 130 See Waseem, Election Commission, supra note 127, at 147 (noting that the ECP is “one 
of the most contentious institutions in Pakistan” and that it is believed that “power-wielders 
generally induct their favorites” onto the commission “with a view to rig and steal the 
elections”). 
 131 The Delimitation of Constituencies Act, No. 34 of 1974, PAK. CODE § 7(2), amended by 
The Delimitation of Constituencies (Amendment) Act, No. 3 of 1989. 
 132 Id. § 8. 
 133 Id. § 9. 
 134 Id. § 10. 
 135 Unlike FPTP systems, where single-member districts fill their seats by assigning them to 
the single candidates that capture a plurality of the votes cast, PR systems directly convert 
each party’s share of the votes into corresponding numbers of seats in multimember districts. 
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR DEMOCRACY AND ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE (IDEA), ELECTORAL 
SYSTEM DESIGN: THE NEW INTERNATIONAL IDEA HANDBOOK 57 (Andrew Reynolds et al. eds., 
2008).  This is different from the plain-language meaning of “proportional representation,” 
which will be discussed in this section—infra p. 155 and note 138—as a measure of the 
degree to which, in any given electoral system, the actual outcome of seat distribution is 
proportional to the distribution of votes. 
 136 See Michael Gallagher, Proportionality, Disproportionality and Electoral Systems, 10 
ELECTORAL STUD. 33, 36 (1991) (noting that the U.S. Constitution’s mandate that members of 
the House of Representatives be apportioned among the states in accordance with their 
respective populations inherently requires the United States to grapple with notions of 
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explicitly mandate proportionality in some limited way.  Even where this is 
missing, however, there is something inherent in the very idea of 
representative democracy that still implies a need for these principles.  
This is made evident by the predominate attitudes towards 
gerrymandering, the process by which the authority in charge of redistricting 
“creates a systematic advantage” for a particular group by the way it 
distributes voters and a corresponding “systematic disadvantage” for another 
group or groups.137  The definition of gerrymandering, however, is relative.  
“Advantage” and “disadvantage” both imply movement away from some 
ideal districting scheme wherein the groups in question are represented in 
some way that is considered better or more accurate.   
This ideal is proportional representation, even in FPTP systems, where its 
full attainment is likely impossible by design.  John Adams famously opined 
that a country’s congress:  
should be in miniature an exact portrait of the people at large.  
It should think, feel, reason, and act like them . . . [I]t should be 
an equal representation, or, in other words, equal interests 
among the people should have equal interests in it.  Great care 
should be taken to effect this, and to prevent unfair, partial, and 
corrupt elections.138 
For Adams, not only is “equal representation” desirable in a representative 
legislature, it is also opposed to “unfair, partial, and corrupt elections,” as 
their unfairness, partiality, and corruption must necessarily result in some 
sort of unequal representation; a representation that is out of proportion in 
some way to the demographics of the “people at large,” preventing it from 
acting as the sort of microcosm that he describes.139  The actual design of the 
U.S. electoral system does not prioritize this proportionality over certain 
other factors,140 and thus it maintains an FPTP, and not a PR, system.  
                                                                                                                   
proportionality); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 267–77 (2004) (discussing frequent efforts 
by Congress to regulate the state redistricting process in order to prevent gerrymandering). 
 137 Justin Buchler, The Inevitability of Gerrymandering: Winners and Losers Under 
Alternative Approaches to Redistricting, 5 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 17, 20 (2010). 
 138 JOHN ADAMS, THOUGHTS ON GOVERNMENT: APPLICABLE TO THE PRESENT STATE OF THE 
AMERICAN COLONIES, reprinted in THE REVOLUTIONARY WRITINGS OF JOHN ADAMS 287, 288–
89 (C. Bradley Thompson ed., 2000). 
 139 Id. 
 140 See IDEA, supra note 135, at 36–37 (listing nine possible advantages of FPTP systems: 
promoting (1) the dominance of two main parties, (2) a single-party government, (3) coherent 
opposition to that government within the legislature, (4) parties with broad bases, (5) a 
geographical link between constituents and representatives, (6) voting on the basis of 
individuals rather than parties, (7) the election of popular independent candidates; (8) 
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However, like all systems, within its other parameters it seeks to be as 
proportional as possible—at least in theory. 
But proportional to what?  In what ways is it important for the legislature 
to be an “exact portrait” in miniature of the electorate?  It could be argued 
that many demographic qualities are politically important enough that they 
should be reflected in the composition of the legislature, including race, 
ethnicity, gender, and perhaps even age.  One of the most commonly 
discussed qualities in this context, however, is party affiliation, likely 
because it is a quality that is entirely ideological and it is easy to measure.  It 
is partisan gerrymandering that IRCs like the one approved by the United 
States Supreme Court in Arizona State Legislature are designed to combat.141  
One valuable barometer for assessing the efficacy of IRCs, then, would seem 
to be partisan proportional representation.  
In the following subsections, this Note will use indices of partisan 
proportionality to measure the comparative success of IRCs in the four FPTP 
systems discussed above as well as the system in the United States.  To 
perform this analysis, data from ten different elections was studied, two in 
each country: the general elections to the Jatiya Sangsad of Bangladesh in 
2001 and 2008142; the National Assembly of Botswana in 2009 and 2014; the 
Lok Sabha of India in 2009 and 2014; the Pakistani National Assembly in 
2008 and 2013; and the House of Representatives of the United States in 
2012 and 2014.143 
A.  The Loosemore and Hanby Index 
All indices that seek to quantify the partisan proportionality of a given 
electoral system do so by comparing the percentage of the votes that were 
cast for a particular party—its vote share—to the percentage of the elected 
seats the party won—its seat share.144  In any system, there will always be at 
least some disparity between these two numbers for at least some of the 
parties involved, even if only because of problems of division.145  The goal in 
                                                                                                                   
excluding extremist parties from the legislature; and (9) being “simple and easy to 
understand”). 
 141 Ariz. State Legis. v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2677 (2015). 
 142 Unlike with the other countries discussed, the most recent election data for Bangladesh 
was not used.  For an explanation of the reasoning for this discussion, see supra note 68 and 
accompanying text. 
 143 For the data that was used to conduct this analysis, along with its relevant sources, see 
infra APPENDICES A–E. 
 144 PIETRO GRILLI DI CORTONA ET AL., EVALUATION AND OPTIMIZATION OF ELECTORAL 
SYSTEMS 44 (1999). 
 145 See id. (noting that “some distortion between the quota of votes and seats will always 
exist, mainly because the number of seats that can be assigned to each party must be an 
integer,” which often make complete proportionality mathematically impossible). 
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taking such a measurement, then, is not to determine if a given country has 
met some particular universal benchmark, but rather to facilitate the 
comparison of electoral systems in different countries. 
The most common, and perhaps the most simple index for proportionality 
is the one developed by Loosemore and Hanby in 1971 (LH).146  This 
formula adds together the absolute values of the differences between the vote 
share and the seat share of each party that received at least one vote in the 
election and then divides the resulting number in half.147  The end product is 
a number between zero and 100 that indicates the amount of 
disproportionality in the system, with more proportional systems producing 
values closer to zero.148 
As is shown in Table 1, for the elections studied here, the system that 
produced the lowest values with LH was the United States.  Both its 2012 
and 2014 values are substantially below the values for all of the elections 
measured in all of the other countries.  Its nearest competitor in 
proportionality, the 2008 election in Pakistan, is still around four points 
higher than either U.S. value, and nearly all the other elections produce 
values at least twenty points higher in disproportionality. 
 
Table 1 – The Loosemore & Hanby Index 
ELECTION Bangladesh Botswana India Pakistan United States 
Most Recent (2008) 30.3169
149
 (2014) 18.4580 (2014) 34.2319 (2013) 33.5982 (2014) 05.7311 
2nd Most 
Recent 
(2001) 24.8239 (2009) 23.9293 (2009) 19.8763 (2008) 09.7589 (2012) 05.8204 
 
If IRCs were truly effective at reducing partisan gerrymandering, we might 
expect to see rates of disproportionality in the countries that employ them 
that are significantly lower than the rates in countries like the United States, 
which largely do not.  This, however, is the exact opposite of what the LH 
data in this study shows.  The United States has by far the lowest LH index 
of the countries studied, seeming to suggest that IRCs do not have the 
prophylactic effect on partisan gerrymandering that has been hoped. 
                                                                                                                   
 146 Gallagher, supra note 136, at 38. 
 147 DI CORTONA ET AL., supra note 144, at 45.  In mathematical notation, the formula is 
expressed as ܮܪ = 	∑ |ఠ೔ି	ఙ೔|೙೔సభ ଶ  , where n is the number of parties, ߱௜ is the vote share of each 
party, ߪ௜	is the seat share of each party, and LH is the resulting indexical value. 
 148 Id. 
 149 This is not the most recent Bangladeshi legislative election.  See supra note 68 and 
accompanying text. 
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Though LH is one of the most commonly used proportionality indices, 
however, it is not without its flaws.  Several scholars have noted that the 
nature of its calculation unfairly penalizes systems that use many small 
parties as compared to a few large ones.150  This helps to explain the 
extremely large values returned by some of the elections in India and 
Pakistan, each of which had over 100 parties on their ballots.  Several other 
indices have been compiled to address this and other shortcomings of LH, 
and the two most commonly used of these are explored in the sections that 
follow. 
B.  Gallagher’s Least Squares Index 
In his 1991 analysis of methods of measuring disproportionality in 
electoral systems, Michael Gallagher advocated using a “least squares” index 
(LS).151  Unlike LH, this measure is affected more by large discrepancies in 
the ratio of vote-share to seat-share than it is by many small ones, thereby 
eliminating the bias towards systems with fewer political parties on the 
ballot.152  To calculate this value, the difference between the vote-share and 
seat-share of each party is squared, these numbers are summed, and the 
square-root of half of this number is then taken.153  Again, the value this 
formula produces is a number between 0 and 100, where higher values 
indicate a higher level of disproportionality.154 
As is shown in Table 2, applying LS to the elections in this study 
produces values that are overall lower than those produced by LH (especially 
in India) and also reduces the relative distances between the values.  Despite 
this change, however, the elections in the United States still produce the 
lowest values, by a significant margin.  These results seem to suggest that the 
lack of positive correlation between the usage of IRCs and the lower rates of 
disproportionality that were demonstrated by the LH index cannot be 
explained away just by differences in number of political parties.  
 
 
                                                                                                                   
 150 See, e.g., Gallagher, supra note 136, at 40. 
 151 Id. at 49. 
 152 Id. at 40. 
 153 Id. In mathematical notation, this formula is expressed as ܮܵ = 	ට∑ ሺఠ೔ିఙ೔ሻమ೙೔సభ ଶ 	, where n is 
the number of parties, ߱௜	is the vote share of each party, ߪ௜ is the seat share of each party, and 
LS is the resulting indexical value. 
 154 Id.  
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Table 2 – Gallagher’s Least Squares Index 
ELECTION Bangladesh Botswana India Pakistan United States 
Most Recent 
 
(2008) 25.2512
155
 (2014) 17.0141 (2014) 17.7594 (2013) 22.9524 (2014) 04.4618 
2nd Most 
Recent 
 (2001) 21.3691 (2009) 20.1603 (2009) 08.2044 (2008) 06.5681 (2012) 04.5736 
C.  Effective Number of Parties and the Lijphart Index 
Another index that seeks to counteract the effect of differing numbers of 
parties on the disproportionality measure is the one devised by Lijphart in 
1990 (LJ).156  In order to tackle this issue head-on, LJ uses a calculated figure 
called the “effective number of parties” (Nα).157  This figure represents the 
functional number of parties that actually affect and have power in a given 
electoral system, as distinct from the raw number of parties that appear on a 
country’s ballots.158  As with disproportionality, there are several different 
formulae that are used to determine Nα.  For the purposes of this Note, the 
approach developed by Golosov in 2010 will be used because it produces a 
value that is most in-line with “intuitive expectation[s]”—is an important 
consideration as it aligns the data with the actual subjective experiences of 
the voter base.159  A formula for Nα that yielded a value much greater than 
two for the U.S. electoral system, for example, would be at odds with the 
American voter experience, where third parties almost never win national 
elections, and are often not even represented on the ballots in most states.160 
Golosov’s formula takes the number of votes cast for each individual 
party that received at least one vote and subtracts it from a number equal to 
the square of the number of votes cast for the party that received the most 
votes (the winner) divided by the number of votes cast for that particular 
party again.  This number is then added to the overall number of votes cast in 
the entire election, to produce a number by which the overall number of 
                                                                                                                   
 155 This is not the most recent Bangladeshi legislative election.  See supra note 68 and 
accompanying text. 
 156 DI CORTONA ET AL., supra note 144, at 45. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. at 35–36. 
 159 Grigorii V. Golosov, The Effective Number of Parties: A New Approach, 16 PARTY POL. 
171, 176 (2010).  For an overview of other available indices for Nα.  See, e.g., DI CORTONA ET 
AL., supra note 144, at 35–41. 
 160 BUREAU OF INT’L INFO. PROGRAMS, supra note 10. 
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votes cast is then divided. This produces a value for each participating party, 
and these numbers are summed to produce the value of the index.161 
The Lijphart Index differs from the Loosemore & Hanby Index only in 
that it divides the sum of the absolute differences between vote-shares and 
seat-shares by the figure derived above, Nα, instead of by the static integer 
two.162  The result is a value, still between 0 and 100 and still showing higher 
disproportionality at higher levels, but that is directly responsive to the 
effective number of parties in the system. 
Table 3163 shows that LJ produces values for this analysis’ data set that 
are in a still more narrow distribution.  India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh all 
see further decreases from LS values, while numbers for the United States 
and Botswana are higher than for LS but still lower than LH.  Most notably, 
the election that produces the lowest disproportionality score is no longer in 
the United States as Pakistan’s 2008 election surpasses both of those in the 
United States by a narrow margin.  India’s 2009 election, while not less 
disproportional than the U.S. elections, is also very close to these values.  
Both India and Pakistan’s low values are somewhat overshadowed by the 
much higher values they received for their more recent elections, however.  
As a result of this, the United States still has the lowest incidence of 
disproportionality by a margin of nearly three points when the results of each 
country’s two elections are averaged.164 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                   
 161 Golosov, supra note 159, at 180–83.  In mathematical notation, this formula is expressed 
as ఈܰ = 	∑ ∑ ௦೔
೙భ
൬∑ ௦೔೙భ ା	൬ೞభ
మ
ೞ೔
൰ି௦೔൰
௡௜ୀଵ 	 , where n is the number of parties, ∑ ݏ௜௡ଵ  is the total number of 
votes cast, ݏ௜	is the number of votes cast for each party, ݏଵ	is the number of votes cast for the 
party that received the most votes, and ఈܰ is the resulting indexical value. 
 162 DI CORTONA ET AL., supra note 144, at 45.  In mathematical notation, this formula is 
expressed as ܮܬ = 	 ∑ |ఠ೔ି	ఙ೔|೙೔సభேഀ  , where n is the number of parties,	߱௜	is the vote share of each 
party, ߪ௜ is the seat share of each party, ఈܰ	is the effective number of parties, and LJ is the 
resulting indexical value. 
 163 See infra p. 161. 
 164 Averaged values: Bangladesh = 21.2008, Botswana = 19.1414, India = 8.5973, Pakistan 
= 9.5770, and U.S. = 5.5827. 
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Table 3 – The Lijphart Index and Nα 
ELECTION Bangladesh Botswana India Pakistan United States 
Most Recent  
Nα 
LJ 
(2008)
165
 
2.4324 
24.9272 
(2014) 
2.3735 
15.5535 
(2014) 
6.0340 
11.3465 
(2013) 
4.5901 
14.6394 
(2014) 
2.0263 
5.6567 
2nd Most 
Recent 
Nα 
LJ 
(2001) 
2.8412 
17.4744 
(2009) 
2.1056 
22.7293 
(2009) 
6.7976 
5.8480 
(2008) 
4.3233 
4.5146 
(2012) 
2.1131 
5.5087 
  
This data shows that even when the smaller number of effective political 
parties in the United States is adjusted for in the calculations, U.S. federal 
congressional elections enjoy lower rates of partisan disproportionality than 
do elections in all of the studied countries with similar electoral features.  As 
these other countries make widespread use of IRCs, while the U.S. uses 
almost no IRCs for federal legislative districting, this suggests that IRCs may 
not actually be effective at creating districting plans that allow their 
electorates to be proportionately represented.  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
There are, of course, many different possible explanations for the 
differences in proportional representation, and it is not possible on the 
information from this data alone to announce with confidence even that there 
is definitively less partisan gerrymandering in the United States than in the 
other four countries.  Michael Gallagher identifies only five possible reasons 
for disproportionality in a system, however, and none of them but 
malapportionment applies in the contexts discussed herein.166  This data 
                                                                                                                   
 165 This is not the most recent Bangladeshi legislative election.  See supra note 68 and 
accompanying text. 
 166 The possible reasons are: (1) the use of a bad formula in a PR system, (2) irregularities 
caused by strange distributions of votes between parties, (3) district magnitude, (4) the use of 
minimum thresholds for the recognition of parties, and (5) malapportionment, or 
gerrymandering.  Reasons one and three cannot apply to any of the systems discussed in this 
Note, as none of them are PR systems and all of them use single-member districts.  The 
possibility of item two is corrected for by the use of the Lijphart Index and its accounting for 
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seems to suggest strongly, then, that there is less partisan gerrymandering in 
the United States than there is in the four FPTP countries discussed here that 
use IRCs.  And while it certainly cannot be said from only this information 
that IRCs are the cause of this difference, it is equally certain that their 
disproportionality remains significantly higher than that of the U.S. despite 
their use of IRCs.  
Despite the optimistic projections following the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting 
Commission, the data studied in this Note suggests that IRCs will not 
necessarily provide a complete solution to partisan gerrymandering. 
Countries using IRCs with electoral systems similar to our own still 
experience high rates of partisan disproportionality in their representation, 
and in at least some cases, those rates are actually substantially higher than 
those that exist in the United States.  Thus, while this data cannot be properly 
read to suggest that IRCs inherently exacerbate partisan gerrymandering, if 
lawmakers continue to institute them in order to address a problem that they 
do not in fact seem to solve, they could still do more harm than good. 
Rather than implementing policies that only seem as though they would 
be helpful, it would be more beneficial to conduct further comparative 
studies on what has worked to reduce partisan gerrymandering and 
disproportionality in other, similar countries.  Such research could help U.S. 
policymakers to develop strategies for hosting elections with outcomes that 
are more proportionate to the constituent population of each area, no matter 
who draws the lines. 
  
                                                                                                                   
the effective number of parties.  Four also does not apply, as thresholds were not used in any 
of this analysis’s calculations.  This only leaves malapportionment.  Gallagher, supra note 
136, at 43. 
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V.  APPENDICES 
A.  Bangladesh167 
2001
168
 2008
169
 
PARTY VOTES SEATS PARTY VOTES SEATS 
Bangladesh Awami 
League 33,388,250 227 
Bangladesh Nationalist 
Party 23,074,714 193 
Bangladesh 
Nationalist Party 22,581,025 31 
Bangladesh Awami 
League 22,303,276 62 
Jatiya Party 4,985,411 27 Jatiya Party 4,023,962 14 
Bangladesh Jamaytee 
Islami 3,289,352 2 
Bangladesh Jamaytee 
Islami 2,385,361 17 
Independent 2,173,220 5 Independent 2,262,305 6 
Islami Andolan 
Bangladesh 651,051 0 Bangladesh Jatiya Party 521,472 4 
Jatiya Samajtantric 
Dal 543,875 4 Islami Oikya Jote 312,868 2 
Bangladesh Workers 
Party 262,093 2 
Krishak Sramik Janata 
League 261,344 1 
Liberal Democrats 
Party 191,994 1 Jatiya Party - JP 243,617 1 
Bangladesh Jatiya 
Party 174,217 1 Jatiya Samajtantric Dal 119,072 0 
Jamiyate Ulamaye 
Islam Bangladesh 173,633 0 
Bangladesh Communist 
Party 56,991 0 
Bikalpodhara 
Bangladesh 146,751 0 
Bangladesh Workers 
Party 40,484 0 
Jaker Party 135,429 0 Bangladesh Islamic Front 30,406 0 
Islami Oikya Jote 108,415 0 Bangladesh Samajtantric Dal 21,349 0 
Jatiyo Ganotantric 
Party 107,796 0 
Jamiyate Ulamaye islam 
Bangladesh 19,256 0 
Krishak Sramik 
Janata League 106,117 0 
Bangladesh Khalafat 
Andolon 13,287 0 
Gano Forum 72,877 0 Gano Forum 8,494 0 
Bangladesh 
Communist Party 42,115 0 
Islami Shasantantra 
Andolon 5,944 0 
                                                                                                                   
 167 Data reflects votes cast in the General Elections for candidates for the Jatiya Sangsad. 
 168 Ken Kollman et al., Constituency-Level Elections Archive, CENTER FOR POLITICAL 
STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, http://www.electiondataarchive.org/countries.html (last 
visited Nov. 15, 2015). 
 169 Id. 
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Bangladesh 
Samajtantric Dal 38,952 0 
Bangladesh National 
Awami Party 4,322 0 
Bangladesh Islamic 
Front 31,450 0 
Bangladesh Progressive 
Party 3,674 0 
NAP 28,530 0 Liberal Democrats Party 3,618 0 
Bangladesh Khalafat 
Majlish 27,916 0 Gonotantri Party 3,190 0 
Bangladesh Kalyan 
Party 21,676 0 
Bangladesh Samajtantrik 
Dal (Mahbub) 2,308 0 
Bangladesh Tarikat 
Federation 19,750 0 Bangladesh Janata Party 1,703 0 
Bangladesh Khalafat 
Andolon 16,907 0 Jaker Party 1,181 0 
Progatishil 
Ganotantrik Dal 13,958 0 
Bangladesh Peoples 
Congress 1,095 0 
NPP 10,343 0 Communist Party 1,042 0 
Gano Front 3,990 0 Bangladesh Krisak Sramik 994 0 
Oikyabadha Nagorik 
Andolan 3,543 0 
Bangladesh Samyabadi 
Dal 972 0 
Gonotantri Party 2,549 0 Bangladesh Hindu League 922 0 
Bangladesh Biplobe 
Workers Party 2,021 0 Bangladesh Gono Azadi 780 0 
Islamic Front 
Bangladesh 1,347 0 
Jatiyo Janata Party (Adv 
Nurul Islam Khan) 657 0 
Bangladesh Muslim 
League 1,217 0 
Bangladesh Muslim 
League 582 0 
Freedom Party 566 0 National Patriotic Party 551 0 
Bangladesh 
Samyabadi Dal 297 0 Liberal Party Bangladesh 528 0 
Grand Total 69,358,633 300 Bangladesh Peoples Party 502 0 
 
Bangladesh Jatiya Tanti 
Dal 441 0 
Bhasani Front 431 0 
Samridha Bangladesh 
Andolon 429 0 
Sramik Krishak 
Samajbadi Dal 391 0 
Desh Prem Party 366 0 
Democratic Republic 
Party 364 0 
Bangladesh Krishak 
Sramik Awami League 313 0 
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Bangladesh 
Manabadhaikir Dal 237 0 
Bangladesh Krishak 
Sramik Janata Party 197 0 
Quran Darshan Sangstha 
Bangladesh 161 0 
Jatiya Janata Party (Sheik 
Asad) 148 0 
Pragatishil Gonotantrik 
Shakti (Pragash) 136 0 
Sama Samaj Gonotantri 
Party 131 0 
Quran And Sunnah 77 0 
Bangladesh Vashani 
Adarsha Bastabayan 
Parishad 
58 0 
Bangladesh Sarbahara 
Party 44 0 
Jatiya Janata Party 
(Hafizur) 30 0 
Grand Total   55,736,777 300 
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B.  Botswana170 
2009
171
 2014
172
 
PARTY VOTES SEATS PARTY VOTES SEATS 
Botswana 
Democratic Party 290,099 44 
Botswana 
Democratic Party 320,647 37 
Botswana National 
Front 119,509 6 
Umbrella for 
Democratic 
Change 
207,113 17 
Botswana Congress 
Party 104,302 5 
Botswana 
Congress Party 140,998 3 
Botswana Alliance 
Movement 12,387 1 Independent 19,787 0 
Independent 10,464 1 Botswana National Front 1,697 0 
Botswana Peoples 
Party 7,554 0 Grand Total 690,242 57 
Mels Movement 
Botswana 292 0 
 Botswana Tlhoko Tiro Organization 40 0 
Grand Total 544,647 57 
 
  
                                                                                                                   
 170 Data reflects votes cast in the General Elections for candidates for the National Assembly. 
 171 Kollman et al., supra note 168. 
 172 Botswana, ELECTIONPASSPORT.COM, http://www.electionpassport.com/ (last visited Nov. 
14, 2015). 
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C.  India173 
2009
174
 2014 
PARTY VOTES SEATS PARTY VOTES
175
 SEATS
176
 
Indian National 
Congress 119,111,019 206 
Bharatiya Janata 
Party 171,657,549 282 
Bharatiya Janata Party 78,435,381 116 Indian National Congress 106,938,242 44 
Bahujan Samaj Party 25,728,920 21 Bahujan Samaj Party 22,946,182 0 
Communist Party of 
India (Marxist) 22,219,111 16 
All India Trinamool 
Congress 21,259,681 34 
Independent 21,647,686 9 Samajwadi Party 18,672,916 5 
Samajwadi Party 14,284,638 23 
All India Anna 
Dravida Munnetra 
Kazhagam 
18,115,825 37 
All India Trinamool 
Congress 13,356,510 19 
Communist Party of 
India (Marxist) 17,986,773 9 
Telugu Desam 10,481,659 6 Independent 16,743,719 3 
Nationalist Congress 
Party 8,521,502 9 Telugu Desam 14,094,545 16 
Dravida Mummetra 
Kazhagam 7,625,397 18 
Yuvajana Sramika 
Rythu Congress 
Party 
13,991,280 9 
All India Anna 
Dravida Munnetra 
Kazhagam 
6,953,591 9 Aam Aadmi Party 11,325,635 4 
Biju Janata Dal 6,612,552 14 Shivsena 10,262,982 18 
Praja Rajyam Party 6,590,046 0 Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam 9,636,430 0 
Shiv Sena 6,454,950 11 Biju Janata Dal 9,491,497 20 
Janata Dal (United) 6,331,201 20 Nationalist Congress Party 8,635,554 6 
Communist Party of 
India 5,951,888 4 
Rashtriya Janata 
Dal 7,442,313 4 
Rashtriya Janata Dal 5,280,084 4 Telangana Rashtra Samithi 6,736,490 11 
Shiromani Akali Dal 4,004,789 4 None of the Above 6,000,197 0 
Janata Dal 
(Samajwadi) 3,434,082 3 Janata Dal (United) 5,992,196 2 
Desiya Murpokku 
Dravida Kazhagam 3,126,117 0 
Communist Party of 
India 4,327,298 1 
                                                                                                                   
 173 Data reflects votes cast in the General Elections for candidates for the Lok Sabha. 
 174 Kollman et al., supra note 168. 
 175 Election Commission of India, Results: General Election 2014, ECI.NIC.IN, http://eci.nic. 
in/eci_main1/GE2014/ge.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2015). 
 176 India: Election for Lok Sabha 2014, ELECTIONGUIDE.ORG, http://www.electionguide.org/ 
elections/id/2784/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2015). 
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Telangana Rashtra 
Samithi 2,582,326 2 Janata Dal (Secular) 3,731,481 2 
All India United 
Democratic Front 2,184,553 1 
Shiromani Akali 
Dal 3,636,148 4 
Pattali Makkal Katchi 1,944,619 0 Indian National Lok Dal 2,799,899 2 
Lok Jan Shakti Party 1,891,963 0 All India United Democratic Front 2,333,040 3 
Rashtriya Lok Dal 1,821,054 5 Lok Jan Shakti Party 2,295,929 6 
Asom Gana Parishad 1,773,103 1 Desiya Murpokku Dravida Kazhagam 2,079,392 0 
Jharkhand Mukti 
Morcha 1,665,173 2 
Pattali Makkal 
Katchi 1,827,566 1 
Revolutionary 
Socialist Party 1,573,650 2 
Revolutionary 
Socialist Party 1,666,380 1 
Maharashtra 
Navnirman Sena 1,503,863 0 
Jharkhand Mukti 
Morcha 1,637,990 2 
All India Forward 
Bloc 1,345,803 2 
Jharkhand Vikas 
Morcha 
(Prajatantrik) 
1,579,772 0 
Indian National Lok 
Dal 1,286,573 0 
Marumalarchi 
Dravida Munnetra 
Kazhagam 
1,417,535 0 
Marumalarchi 
Dravida Munnetra 
Kazhagam 
1,112,908 1 All India Forward Bloc 1,211,418 0 
Communist Party of 
India (Marxist-
Leninist) (Liberation) 
1,044,510 0 Swabhimani Paksha 1,105,073 1 
Jharkhand Vikas 
Morcha (Prajatantrik) 963,274 1 
Indian Union 
Muslim League 1,100,096 2 
Muslim League 877,494 2 Rashtriya Lok Samta Party 1,078,473 3 
Nagaland Peoples 
Front 832,224 1 
Communist Party of 
India (Marxist-
Leninist) 
(Liberation) 
1,007,274 0 
Haryana Janhit 
Congress (BL) 816,395 1 Naga Peoples Front 994,505 1 
Viduthalai 
Chiruthaigal Katchi 735,847 1 Apna Dal 821,820 2 
Bodaland Peoples 
Front 656,430 1 
Bahujan Mukti 
Party 785,358 0 
Kongu Nadu 
Munnetra Kazhagam 579,703 0 
Jammu & Kashmir 
Peoples Democratic 
Party 
732,644 3 
Lok Satta Party 557,376 0 Maharashtra Navnirman sena 708,118 0 
Peace Party 537,638 0 Haryana Janhit Congress (BL) 703,698 0 
Jammu & Kashmir 
Peoples Democratic 
Party 
522,760 0 Rashtriya Lok Dal 696,919 0 
Jammu & Kashmir 
National Conference 498,374 3 
All India Majlis-E-
Ittehadul 
Muslimeen 
685,729 1 
Apna Dal 495,032 0 Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katchi 606,110 0 
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Bharipa Bahujan 
Mahasangh 492,470 0 
Asom Gana 
Parishad 577,730 0 
Swabhimani Paksha 481,025 1 National Peoples Party 576,444 1 
Kerala Congress (M) 404,962 1 
Socialist Unity 
Centre of India 
(Communist) 
520,959 0 
Republican Party of 
India (A) 379,746 0 Peace Party 518,726 0 
Kerala Congress 333,688 0 
Peasants and 
Workers Party of 
India 
497,721 0 
Suheldev Bhartiya 
Samaj Party 319,307 0 AJSU Party 488,719 0 
All India Majlis-
Eittehadul Muslimeen 308,061 1 
Rashtriya Samaj 
Paksha 458,580 0 
Republican Party of 
India 294,650 0 
Kerala Congress 
(M) 424,194 1 
Pyramid Party of 
India 287,576 0 
Jammu & Kashmir 
National 
Conference 
396,713 0 
Loktantrik Samata 
Dal 270,040 0 
Social Democratic 
Party of India 396,522 0 
Mahagujarat Janta 
Party 245,174 0 
Bharipa Bahujan 
Mahasangh 360,854 0 
People’s Democratic 
Alliance 224,719 0 Qaumi Ekta Dal 354,578 0 
Bahujan Vikas 
Aaghadi 223,234 1 
Bodoland Peoples 
Front 330,106 0 
Gondvana Gantantra 
Party 220,741 0 
Socialist Janata 
(Democratic) 307,597 0 
Rashtriya Samaj 
Paksha 215,042 0 
Gondvana 
Gantantra Party 301,366 0 
All Jharkhand 
Students Union Party 200,523 0 
Bahujan Vikas 
Aaghadi 293,681 0 
Swatantra Bharat 
Paksha 188,608 0 Puthiya Tamilagam 262,812 0 
Indian Justice Party 177,759 0 All India N.R. Congress 255,826 1 
Sikkim Democratic 
Front 159,351 1 
Manithaneya 
Makkal Katchi 236,679 0 
Rashtriya Samanta 
Dal 153,455 0 
Welfare Party of 
India 228,642 0 
Rashtriya 
Swabhimaan Party 152,633 0 
Jai Bharat Samanta 
Party 215,607 0 
Rashtrawadi Sena 144,735 0 Jai Samaikyandhra Party 204,235 0 
Rashtriya Dehat 
Morcha Party 139,404 0 Jharkhand Party 203,869 0 
Samruddha Odisha 131,379 0 Republican Party of India (A) 199,848 0 
Jan Parishad 129,595 0 Pyramid Party of India 185,449 0 
Jammu & Kashmir 
People’s Conference 125,900 0 
Ambedkarite Party 
of India 185,095 0 
United Democratic 
Party 124,402 0 Lok Satta Party 169,648 0 
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Autonomous State 
Demand Committee 123,287 0 
Sikkim Democratic 
Front 163,698 1 
Puthiya Tamilagam 120,797 0 Aama Odisha Party 155,900 0 
Lok Bhalai Party 118,470 0 National Unionist Zamindara Party 124,990 0 
Jharkhand Party 
(Naren) 104,600 0 
Sikkim Krantikari 
Morcha 121,956 0 
Jharkhand Disom 
Party 102,698 0 
Suheldev Bhartiya 
Samaj Party 118,947 0 
Mahabharat Peples 
Party 101,787 0 
Communist Party of 
India (Marxist-
Leninist) Red Star 
114,323 0 
Hill State People’s 
Democratic Party 97,613 0 
Marxist 
Coordination 110,185 0 
Marxist Coordination 91,489 0 Jharkhand Disom Party 109,843 0 
J & K National 
Panthers Party 87,502 0 
United Democratic 
Party 106,817 0 
Gondwana mukti 
Sena 85,355 0 
Rashtriya 
Parivartan Dal 95,644 0 
Prabuddha 
Republican Party 76,518 0 
Republican Party of 
India 94,802 0 
National Lokhind 
Party 72,620 0 Bharatiya Ekta Dal 90,315 0 
Rashtriya Krantikari 
Samajwadi Party 71,857 0 
Bhartiya Shakti 
Chetna Party 79,359 0 
Kranti Kari Jai Hind 
Sena 70,715 0 Amra Bangalee 74,628 0 
Manithaneya Makkal 
Katchi 68,346 0 
Jammu & Kashmir 
People Conference 71,154 0 
Jammu & Kashmir 
People Conference 65,403 0 
Republican Paksha 
(Khoripa) 70,924 0 
Mahan Dal 65,398 0 Bahujan Sangharshh Dal 59,813 0 
Krantisena 
Maharashtra 65,151 0 
Samajwadi Janata 
Party (Rashtriya) 59,756 0 
Jago Party 64,482 0 
Akhil Bharatiya 
Muslim League 
(Secular) 
59,735 0 
Ambedkar National 
Congress 60,896 0 
Jai Maha Bharath 
Party 58,014 0 
Sarvodaya Karnataka 
Paksha 60,333 0 
Jammu & Kashmir 
National Panthers 
Party 
57,103 0 
Jharkhand Jan Morcha 58,025 0 Rashtriya Ulama Council 56,324 0 
Pragtisheel Manav 
Samaj Party 57,649 0 
Janta Dal 
Rashtravadi 53,864 0 
Rashtriya Kranti Party 55,805 0 Tamil Nadu Makkal Congress 49,038 0 
Loksangram 53,637 0 Lok Dal 48,198 0 
Kalinga Sena 53,033 0 Janvadi Party(Socialist) 47,690 0 
Trilinga Praja Pragati 
Party 48,136 0 
People’s Party of 
Arunachal 47,018 0 
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Bira Oriya Party 47,720 0 Hindustan Janta Party 46,761 0 
Akhil Bharat Hindu 
Mahasabha 47,456 0 
Rashtriya 
Krantikari 
Samajwadi Party 
46,756 0 
Arunachal Congress 46,539 0 Bharat Vikas Morcha 45,667 0 
Jharkhand Vikas Dal 45,246 0 Odisha Jan Morcha 44,397 0 
Amara Bengali 45,102 0 
Revolutionary 
Socialist Party of 
Kerala (Bolshevik) 
43,051 0 
Rashtra Sewa Dal 43,184 0 Chhattisgarh Swabhiman Manch 41,911 0 
Shiromani Akali Dal 
(Simranjit Singh 
Mann) 
43,137 0 Socialist Party (India) 41,516 0 
Kosal Kranti Dal 42,744 0 Pragatisheel Manav Samaj Party 39,038 0 
Ambedkar Samaj 
Party 42,586 0 
Rajnaitik Vikalp 
Party 38,992 0 
Bahujan Republican 
Ekta Manch 42,386 0 
Bharatiya Yuva 
Shakti 38,633 0 
Loktantrik Samajwadi 
Party 40,803 0 
Rashtriya Deshaj 
Party 38,322 0 
A-Chik National 
Congress 
(Democratic) 
40,204 0 Naitik Party 36,181 0 
Bharatiya Bahujan 
Party 39,797 0 
Shiromani Akali 
Dal (Amritsar) 35,516 0 
Mana Party 39,257 0 Karunaadu Party 33,172 0 
Uttarakhand Kranti 
Dal 38,633 0 
Rashtriya 
Janadhikar 
Suraksha Party 
32,514 0 
Navbharat Nirman 
Party 37,219 0 
Rashtriya Samanta 
Dal 30,880 0 
Rajasthan Vikash 
Party 36,584 0 
Samyak Parivartan 
Party 30,805 0 
Rashtravadi Janata 
Party 34,670 0 
Akhil Bharat Hindu 
Mahasabha 29,483 0 
Bharatiya Jantantrik 
Janta Dal 34,528 0 
Paschimanchal 
Vikas Party 28,775 0 
Bahujan Sangharsh 
Party (Kanshiram) 33,010 0 Prem Janata Dal 28,681 0 
Jharkhand Janadikhar 
Manch 32,219 0 Jago Party 27,624 0 
Eklavya Samaj Party 31,983 0 Jai Prakash Janata Dal 27,619 0 
Samata Party 31,324 0 Ambedkar Samaj Party 27,589 0 
Democratic Secular 
Party 30,532 0 
Jai Hind Samaj 
Party 27,122 0 
People’s Guardian 30,340 0 Vanchitsamaj Insaaf Party 23,991 0 
Samajwadi Janata 
Party (Rashtriya) 30,091 0 
Gareeb Aadmi 
Party 23,505 0 
Lokpriya Samaj Party 29,459 0 Republican Party of India (Khobragade) 23,110 0 
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Rastreeya Praja 29,151 0 Mahan Dal 22,774 0 
Nelopa (United) 27,388 0 
Party for 
Democratic 
Socialism 
22,267 0 
Shoshit Samaj Dal 26,807 0 Mahajana Socialist Party 22,023 0 
Akhil Bartiya Manav 
Seva Dal 26,268 0 Samata Party 21,635 0 
Bharatiya Republican 
Paksha 25,940 0 
Bajjikanchal Vikas 
Party 21,524 0 
Rashtravadi 
Communist Party 25,842 0 
Indigenousn 
People’s Front of 
Tripura 
21,326 0 
Lok Dal 24,588 0 Prajatantrik Samadhan Party 21,284 0 
Jan Surajya Shakti 23,925 0 Kalinga Sena 21,143 0 
Samajwadi Jan 
Parishad 23,539 0 Samata Kranti Dal 20,910 0 
Akhil Bharatiya 
Congress Dal 
(Ambedkar) 
22,861 0 Akhil Bharatiya Jan Sangh 20,902 0 
Rashtravadi Aarthik 
Swatantrata Dal 22,453 0 
Bharatiya National 
Janta Dal 20,209 0 
Akhila India 
Jananayaka Makkal 
Katchi 
21,609 0 Ambedkar National Congress 19,863 0 
Akila India Vallalar 
Peravai 20,982 0 
Prabuddha 
Republican Party 19,470 0 
People’s Democratic 
Forum 20,699 0 
Most Backward 
Classes of India 19,417 0 
Akhil Bharatiya Jan 
Sangh 20,599 0 
Sarvajan Kalyan 
Loktantrik Party 19,253 0 
Moulik Adhikar Party 20,534 0 
Rashtriya 
Janasachetan Party 
(R.J.P.) 
18,206 0 
Bahujan Shakty 18,844 0 Manavtawadi Samaj Party 17,890 0 
Indian Peace Party 18,726 0 Desiya Forward Bloc 17,474 0 
Chhattisgarh Vikas 
Party 18,394 0 
Socialistic 
Democratic Party 17,435 0 
Great India Party 18,161 0 Indian Savarn Samaj Party 16,903 0 
Vanchit Jamat Party 17,868 0 Jharkhand Party (Naren) 16,670 0 
Prajatantrik 
Samadhan Party 17,570 0 
Akhil Bhartiya 
Jharkhand Party 16,616 0 
United Goans 
Democratic Party 16,727 0 
Samata Samadhan 
Party 16,501 0 
Makkal Manadu 
Katchi 16,699 0 
Ambedkarist 
Republican Party 16,461 0 
Bharatiya Sadbhawna 
Samaj Party 15,948 0 Shoshit Samaj Dal 16,446 0 
Marxist Communist 
Party of India (S.S. 
Srivastava) 
15,922 0 
Rashtriya 
Independent 
Morcha 
16,299 0 
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Rashtriya Krantikari 
Janata Party 15,847 0 
Bharatiya Momin 
Front 16,182 0 
Bharatiya Sarvodaya 
Kranti Party 15,734 0 
Nav Bharat 
Democratic Party 16,153 0 
Bharatheeya 
Sadharma 
Samsthapana Party 
15,718 0 Sankhyanupati Bhagidari Party 16,078 0 
Bahujan Uday Manch 15,272 0 Naya Daur Party 15,965 0 
Puthiya Needhi 
Katchi 15,074 0 
Bharatiya Sant Mat 
Party 15,940 0 
Bharat Punarnirman 
Dal 14,974 0 
Moulik Adhikar 
Party 15,742 0 
Smast Bhartiya Party 14,435 0 Sarva Janata Party 15,474 0 
Akhil Bharatiya 
Ashok Sena 13,828 0 Ati Picchara party 15,370 0 
Bharatiya Momin 
Front 13,737 0 
Proutist Sarva 
Samaj 15,368 0 
Bhartiya Jagran Party 13,506 0 Jai Hind Party 14,754 0 
Jana Hitkari Party 13,313 0 
Bharatiya Jan 
Kranti Dal 
(Democratic) 
14,685 0 
Rashtriya Jan-Jagram 
Morcha 13,194 0 
Indian Christian 
Secular Party 14,353 0 
Ulzaipali Makkal 
Katchy 13,193 0 Swaraj (J) 14,152 0 
Republician Party of 
India Ektawadi 12,767 0 Indian Unity Centre 13,527 0 
Rashtriya Janwadi 
Party (Krantikari) 12,732 0 Lok Bharati 13,399 0 
Jawan kisan Morcha 12,716 0 Maharashtra Parivartan Sena (T) 13,339 0 
United Women Front 12,338 0 Lokpriya Samaj Party 13,304 0 
Chhattisgarhi Samaj 
Party 11,972 0 
Rashtriya Ahinsa 
Manch 13,185 0 
Loktanrik Sarkar 
Party 11,893 0 
Marxist Communist 
Party of India 
(United) 
13,028 0 
Republican Paksha 
(Khoripa) 11,724 0 Rashtriya Apna Dal 12,366 0 
Peoples Republican 
Party 11,341 0 
Jharkhand 
Anushilan Party 12,240 0 
Bharatiya Samta 
Samaj Party 11,151 0 
Andhra Rastra Praja 
Samithi 12,043 0 
Bajjikanchal Vikas 
Party 11,097 0 
Adarsh Rashtriya 
Vikas Party 12,037 0 
Bahujan Samaj 
Party(Ambedkar-
Phule) 
10,698 0 Indian National League 11,924 0 
Kosi Vikas Party 10,447 0 Aadivasi Sena Party 11,362 0 
All India Minorities 
Front 10,211 0 
Swarajya Party Of 
India 11,361 0 
Aadivasi Sena Party 9,936 0 Majlis Bachao Tahreek 11,347 0 
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Jammu & Kashmir 
Awami National 
Conference 
9,900 0 Minorities Democratic Party 11,225 0 
Bharatiya Minorities 
Suraksha Mahasangh 9,871 0 
Akhil Bhartiya 
Mithila Party 11,221 0 
Socialist Party 
(Lohia) 9,712 0 
National Loktantrik 
Party 11,174 0 
Bharatiya Praja 
Paksha 9,457 0 
Bahujan Samaj 
Party (Ambedkar) 11,104 0 
Lok Bharati 9,407 0 Jharkhand Vikas Dal 10,870 0 
Lok Vikas Party 9,198 0 
Regional 
Democratic Secular 
Congress 
10,800 0 
Rajyadhikara Party 9,005 0 Rashtriya Janwadi Party (Krantikari) 10,797 0 
All India Dalit 
Welfare Congress 8,961 0 
Jamat-E-Seratul 
Mustakim 10,564 0 
Meghalaya 
Democratic Party 8,946 0 
Megh Desham 
Party 10,490 0 
Manav Mukti Morcha 8,839 0 Sarva Samaj Kalyan Party 10,239 0 
Backward Classes 
Democratic Party, 
J&K 
8,129 0 
Bharat 
Bhrashtachar Mitao 
Party 
10,160 0 
Bharatiya Eklavya 
Party 8,105 0 
Rashtriya 
Gondvana Party 10,142 0 
Akhil Bhartiya 
Rajarya Sabha 8,065 0 
Loktantrik Janata 
Party (Secular) 10,026 0 
Rashtriya Raksha Dal 7,915 0 Samajwadi Jan Parishad 10,008 0 
Jan Morcha 7,826 0 All India Minorities Front 9,938 0 
Democratic Bharatiya 
Samaj Party 7,817 0 Samruddha Odisha 9,794 0 
Revolutionary 
Communist Party of 
India (Rasik Bhatt) 
7,788 0 Samtawadi Republican Party 9,561 0 
Bharatiya Gaon taj 
Dal 7,764 0 
Bharatiya Dr. 
B.R.Ambedkar 
Janta Party 
9,481 0 
Bundelkhand Akikrit 
Party 7,593 0 Aam Janata Party 9,372 0 
Ajeya Bharat Party 7,567 0 Apna Dal United Party 9,265 0 
Indian Union Muslim 
League 7,553 0 
Ulzaipali Makkal 
Katchy 9,194 0 
Purvanchal Rajya 
Banao Dal 7,497 0 
Tripura Pragatishil 
Gramin Congress 8,952 0 
Ambedkar 
Pragatisheel 
Republican Dal 
7,482 0 Hindusthan Nirman Dal 8,889 0 
The Humanist Party 
of India 7,296 0 
Hindusthan Praja 
Paksha 8,853 0 
Rashtriya Machhua 
Samaj Party 7,290 0 
Bhartiya Ekta 
Manch Party 8,729 0 
Bharatiya Natiional 
Janta Dal 7,194 0 
Rashtravadi Janata 
Party 8,713 0 
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Hindustan Janata 
Party 7,054 0 Aadijan Mukti Sena 8,544 0 
B. C. United Front 6,910 0 Makkal Manadu Katchi 8,468 0 
Bharatiya Jantantrik 
Parishad 6,872 0 Kosal Kranti Dal 8,448 0 
Ambedkarist 
Republican Party 6,672 0 
Bharatiya 
Republican Paksha 8,226 0 
Maharashtrawadi 
Gomantak 6,638 0 
Rajasthan Vikas 
Party 8,152 0 
Proutist Sarva Samaj 
Party 6,316 0 Shramajeevi Party 8,003 0 
Bharatiya Subhash 
Sena 6,250 0 
Hindustan Vikas 
Dal 7,921 0 
Akhil Bharatiya Desh 
Bhakt Morcha 6,220 0 
Kisan Majdoor 
Berojgar Sangh 7,839 0 
Party for Democratic 
Socialism 6,141 0 
Dalita Bahujana 
Party 7,746 0 
People’s Party of 
Arunachal 5,996 0 
Rashtriya 
Congress(J) Party 7,650 0 
Rashtriya Janhit Party 5,841 0 All India Peoples’ Front (Radical) 7,630 0 
Vikas Party 5,840 0 Krantikari Vikas Dal 7,541 0 
Professionals Party of 
India 5,819 0 
Bharatiya Kisan 
Parivartan Party 7,342 0 
Republican Party of 
India (Democratic) 5,809 0 People’s Guardian 7,222 0 
Duggar Pradesh Party 5,660 0 Bharatiya Bahujan Congress 7,197 0 
Bharat Vikas Morcha 5,645 0 Rashtriya Jan-Jagram Morcha 7,147 0 
Republican Party of 
India (Khobragade) 5,566 0 
Sanatan Sanskriti 
Raksha Dal 7,115 0 
Bharatiya Samaj Dal 5,565 0 B. C. United Front 7,036 0 
Samajtantric Party of 
India 5,537 0 Rashtra Sewa Dal 6,994 0 
Rashtrawadi Labour 
Party 5,460 0 
Sanyukt Samajwadi 
Dal 6,788 0 
National Loktantrik 
Party 5,371 0 Bihar Janta Party 6,765 0 
Bharatiya Peoples 
Party 5,226 0 
Hindustan 
Krantikari Dal 6,703 0 
Bharatiya Lok Kalyan 
Dal 5,197 0 
Sarvajan Samaj 
Party (D) 6,681 0 
Sunder Samaj Party 5,120 0 Jan Shakti Ekta Party 6,636 0 
Lal Morcha 5,087 0 Samaikya Telugu Rajyam 6,517 0 
Bharatiya Sampuran 
Krantikari Party 5,068 0 
Socialist 
Republican Party 6,512 0 
Jai Bharat Samanta 
Party 4,967 0 Proutist Bloc, India 6,509 0 
Samajik Jantantrik 
Party 4,816 0 
United Communist 
Party of India 6,472 0 
Praja Bharath Party 4,810 0 Indian Labour Party (Ambedkar Phule) 6,390 0 
GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE) 5/17/2017  2:57 PM 
2016] NO MATTER WHO DRAWS THE LINES 175 
 
Bharathdiya Sahayog 
Congress 4,758 0 
Republican 
Backward Congress 6,265 0 
Sikkim Himali Rajya 
Parishdad 4,639 0 
Rashtriya 
Naujawan Dal 6,192 0 
Uttar Pradesh 
Republican Party 4,604 0 Al-Hind Party 5,977 0 
Rashtriya Mazdoor 
Ekta Party 4,588 0 
Aarakshan Virodhi 
Party 5,861 0 
Muslim Majlis Uttar 
Pradesh 4,444 0 
Bhartiya Sarvjan 
Party 5,845 0 
Inqalab Vikas Dal 4,439 0 The Lok Party of India 5,804 0 
Awami Party 4,386 0 Rashtriya Bahujan Congress Party 5,799 0 
Bharatiya Jan 
Berojgar Chhatra Dal 4,307 0 
Bharatiya Gaon Taj 
Dal 5,761 0 
Bharat Uday Mission 4,210 0 Apna Desh Party 5,579 0 
Rashtriya Agraniye 
Dal 4,072 0 
Deshbhakt Nirman 
Party 5,485 0 
Krantikari Samyavadi 
Party 4,035 0 
Bahujan Sangharsh 
Party (Kanshiram) 5,416 0 
Rashtriya Praja 
Congress (Secular) 3,980 0 Moderate Party 5,406 0 
Republican Presidium 
Party of India 3,894 0 
Bundelkhand 
Congress 5,371 0 
Lok Jan Vikas 
Morcha 3,658 0 
Bharatiya Inqalab 
Party 5,362 0 
People’s Democratic 
Front 3,502 0 
Eklavya Samaj 
Party 5,341 0 
Bharatiya Loktantrik 
Party (Gandhi-
Lohiawadi) 
3,359 0 
Democratic 
Bharatiya Samaj 
Party 
5,240 0 
Bharatiya Pichhra Da 3,292 0 Agar Jan Party 5,228 0 
Rashtriya Naujawan 
Dal 3,155 0 
Indian Krantikari 
Lehar 5,084 0 
Rashtra Bhakt Dal 3,138 0 New India Party 5,082 0 
Yuva Vikas Party 3,129 0 Moolniwasi Samaj Party 4,986 0 
Jan Chetna Party 2,987 0 Bhartiya Satya Sangharsh Party 4,956 0 
Sikkim Jan-Ekta Party 2,849 0 Samajwadi Samaj Party 4,947 0 
Bharatiya Samaj 
Kalyan Party Bharat 2,822 0 
Samaikyandhra 
Parirakshana 
Samithi 
4,870 0 
Bhartiya Pragatisheel 
Congress 2,798 0 
Poorvanchal 
Rashtriya Congress 4,852 0 
Jharkhand Dal 2,787 0 Kalyankari Jantantrik Party 4,839 0 
National 
Development Party 2,787 0 Jan-Nyay Dal 4,719 0 
Momin Conference 2,765 0 Bhartiya Jantantrik Janata Dal 4,664 0 
All India Forward 
Bloc (Subhasist) 2,758 0 
Bharatiya Bahujan 
Party 4,653 0 
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Rashtriya Sahara 
Party 2,754 0 
Rashtriya Jankranti 
Morcha 4,647 0 
Indian People’s 
Forward Block 2,686 0 Yuva Sarkar 4,578 0 
Alpjan Samaj Party 2,678 0 Rashtriya Congress (Babu Jagjivanram) 4,527 0 
Ambedkarbadi Party 2,664 0 
Rayalaseema 
Parirakshana 
Samithi 
4,521 0 
United National 
Loktantrik Party 2,658 0 Jan Sevak Party 4,489 0 
Akhil Bharatiya Hind 
Kranti Party 2,633 0 
Shakti Sena (Bharat 
Desh) 4,465 0 
Orissa Mukti Morcha 2,591 0 Braj Vikas Party 4,411 0 
Youth and Students 
Party 2,582 0 
Manav Mukti 
Morcha 4,409 0 
Laghujan Samaj 
Vikas Party 2,507 0 
Lok Parivartan 
Party(DC) 4,396 0 
Jharkhand People’s 
Party 2,498 0 
All J & K Kisan 
Majdoor Party 4,392 0 
Democratic Congress 
Party 2,497 0 
Akhil Bharatiya 
Shivsena 
Rashtrawadi 
4,380 0 
Savarn Samaj Party 2,486 0 Awami Aamjan Party 4,378 0 
Jansatta Party 2,468 0 Rashtriya Ambedkar Dal 4,327 0 
Jai Chhattisgarh Party 2,397 0 Bharatiya Peoples Party 4,291 0 
Rastriya Samajwadi 
Party (Secular) 2,305 0 
Jai Vijaya Bharathi 
Party 4,270 0 
Moderate Party 2,285 0 Chhattisgarhiya Party 4,265 0 
Sikkim Gorkha 
Prajatantric Party 2,284 0 
Bhartiya Krishak 
Dal 4,250 0 
National Yoduth 
Party 2,275 0 
Rastriya Insaaf 
Party 4,219 0 
Sardar Vallabhbhai 
Patel Party 2,275 0 
Rashtriya Sarvajan 
Party 4,215 0 
Kannada Chalevali 
Vatal Paksha 2,269 0 
Bhartiya 
Vanchitsamaj Party 4,144 0 
Rashtriya Bahujan 
Congress Party 2,244 0 
Dharam Nirpeksh 
Dal 4,130 0 
bhartidya Deshbhakt 
Party 2,217 0 
Rashtriya Janpriya 
Party 4,117 0 
Rashtriya Jan Sahay 
Dal 2,202 0 
Rashtriya Kranti 
Party 4,112 0 
Desia Pathukappu 
Kazhagam 2,154 0 Rajyadhikara Party 4,112 0 
Youth for Equality 2,099 0 Parcham Party of India 4,082 0 
Rajya Nojawan Shakti 
Party 2,041 0 
Pragatisheel Samaj 
Party 4,052 0 
Rashtriya Lokwadi 
Party 2,021 0 
Swatantra Samaj 
Party 4,016 0 
Rashtriya Janutthan 
Party 2,005 0 
Vichara Jagruthi 
Congress Paksha 3,972 0 
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Rashtriya Lokhit 
Party 1,866 0 Janta Raj Party 3,846 0 
Indian Christian 
Secular Party 1,853 0 
Nirjatita Samaj 
Biplabi Party 3,829 0 
Mahila Adhikar Party 1,816 0 Bharatiya Kisan Sena Loktantrik 3,826 0 
Rashtriya Gondvana 
Party 1,802 0 
New All India 
Congress Party 3,778 0 
Rashtriya Mangalam 
Party 1,780 0 Awami Vikas Party 3,750 0 
Indian Bahujan 
Smajwadi Party 1,780 0 Lok Shakti 3,722 0 
Buddhiviveki Vikas 
Party 1,774 0 
National 
Development Party 3,618 0 
Advait Ishwasyam 
Congress 1,718 0 
Jharkhand Mukti 
Morcha  (Ulgulan) 3,512 0 
United Communist 
Party of India 1,713 0 
Indian Peoples 
Green Party 3,488 0 
Shivrajya Party 1,704 0 Asankhya Samaj Party 3,482 0 
Karnataka Thamizhar 
Munnetra Kazhagam 1,686 0 
Bharatiya 
Minorities Suraksha 
Mahasangh 
3,441 0 
Akhil Bhartiya 
Manavata Paksha 1,619 0 
Rashtriya Aam 
Party 3,408 0 
National Democratic 
People’s Front 1,557 0 
Bharat Ki Lok 
Jimmedar Party 3,392 0 
Bharatiya Backward 
Party 1,552 0 
Bharti Jan Suraksha 
Party 3,336 0 
Rashtriya Surya 
Prakash Party 1,532 0 
Rashtriya Sant 
Sandesh Party 3,283 0 
Janata Party 1,514 0 National Tiger Party 3,251 0 
Bharatiya Nagrik 
Party 1,464 0 
Bharatiya Rashtriya 
Bahujan Samaj 
Vikas Party 
3,238 0 
Bahujan Vikas Party 1,435 0 Pragatisheel Magahi Samaj 3,076 0 
Bharatiya Rashtriya 
Party 1,407 0 
National Lokmat 
Party 3,072 0 
Rashtriya Janadhikar 
Party 1,394 0 
Ezhuchi Tamilargal 
Munnetra 
Kazhagam 
3,023 0 
Kamaraj Desiya 
Congress 1,341 0 
Ex-Sainik Kissan 
Party 2,988 0 
Majdoor Kisan Union 
Party 1,341 0 
Shoshit Sandesh 
Party 2,982 0 
Christian Democratic 
Front 1,300 0 
Maharashtra Vikas 
Aghadi 2,979 0 
Bharatiya Jan Shakti 1,296 0 Rashtriya Viklang Party 2,958 0 
Rayalaseema Rashtra 
Samithi 1,284 0 Nagrik Ekta Party 2,917 0 
Bharatiya Jai Bheem 
Party 1,253 0 
Republican 
Bahujan Sena 2,910 0 
Bhartiya Chaitanya 
Party 1,246 0 
Gorkha Rashtriya 
Congress 2,906 0 
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Bharatiya Jan kranti 
Dal (Democratic) 1,245 0 Jan Morcha 2,901 0 
Punjab Labour Party 1,243 0 Vishva Hindustani Sangathan 2,880 0 
Swarajya Party of 
India 1,230 0 
Rashtriya mahan 
Gantantra Party 2,872 0 
All India Bahujan 
Samman Party 1,217 0 
Loktantrik 
Samajwadi Party 2,820 0 
Bundelkhand Mukti 
Morcha 1,211 0 
Rani Chennamma 
Party 2,803 0 
Akhil Bharatiya 
Mahasand Sarvahara 
Krantikari Party 
1,197 0 Hindustan Kranti Dal 2,762 0 
Anaithindia Dravidar 
Samudaya Munnetra 
Kazhagam 
1,189 0 
Andhra Pradesh 
Rashtra Samaikya 
Samithi Party 
2,752 0 
Save Goa Front 1,117 0 Jawan Kisan Morcha 2,711 0 
Namadhu Makkal 
Katchi 1,114 0 Prism 2,694 0 
Akhil Bharatiya 
Shivsena Rashtrawadi 1,108 0 
Rashtriya Janshakti 
Party(Eklavya) 2,654 0 
Maidani Kranti Dal 1,106 0 Great India Party 2,594 0 
Jai Jawan Jai Kisan 
Mazdoor Congress 1,100 0 
Bhartiya 
Pragatisheel 
Congress 
2,571 0 
All India Bharti Jug 
Party 1,085 0 Inqalab Vikas Dal 2,570 0 
Bhartiya Congress 
(M) 1,069 0 
Telangana Loksatta 
Party 2,568 0 
Matra Bhakta Party 1,006 0 Jan Raajya Party 2,543 0 
Pachai Kudi Makkal 
Katchi 981 0 
Bharat Nav Nirman 
Party 2,533 0 
Akhil Rashtrawadi 
Party 969 0 
Akhil Bharatiya 
Samajwadi 
Congress 
2,530 0 
Vishva Hindustani 
Sangathan 935 0 
Namadhu Makkal 
Katchi 2,511 0 
Mool Bharati (s) Party 910 0 Mahamukti Dal 2,482 0 
National Secular Party 902 0 Mahila Swabhiman Party 2,425 0 
Bharatiya Rashtriya 
Morcha 867 0 
Bharatiya 
Sarvodaya Kranti 
Party 
2,409 0 
Vishwa Vikas Sangh 837 0 Rashtriya Vikas Party 2,396 0 
Jai Bharat Party 836 0 
Anaithindia 
Dravidar Samudaya 
Munnetra 
Kazhagam 
2,372 0 
Bharat ki lok 
Jimmedar Party 790 0 Sarvshreshth Dal 2,329 0 
Akhil Bhartiya 
Sindhu Samajwadi 
Party 
786 0 
Telangana 
Communist Party of 
India 
2,311 0 
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Bharat Dal 700 0 
Akhil Bhartiya 
Vikas Congress 
Party 
2,255 0 
Federal Congress of 
India 684 0 Jantantra Party 2,249 0 
All India Raksha 
Party 678 0 
Rashtriya 
Rashtrawadi Party 2,225 0 
Adarshwadi Dal 614 0 National Janhit Congress (AB) 2,196 0 
Janata Uday Party 595 0 Rashtrawadi Samaj Party 2,181 0 
Shakti Sena (Bharat 
Desh) 589 0 
Dharmarajya 
Paksha 2,175 0 
Rashtriya Vikas Party 584 0 Indian Peace Party 2,155 0 
Peoples Party of India 
(Secular) 578 0 
Bhartiya 
Republican Party 
(Insan) 
2,138 0 
Akhil Bhartiya 
Loktantra Party 578 0 Atulya Bharat Party 2,135 0 
Jebamani Janata 573 0 Mahanwadi Party 2,101 0 
Niswarth Sewa Party 573 0 Rashtriya Karmyog Party 2,096 0 
Hind Vikas Party 532 0 Uttarakhand Parivartan Party 2,045 0 
Desh Bhakt Party 531 0 Akhil Rashtrawadi Party 2,029 0 
Bharatiya 
Sarvkalayan Kranti 
Dal 
496 0 Rashtriya Praja Congress (Secular) 2,025 0 
Democratic Party of 
India 494 0 
Manipur 
Democratic 
Peoples’s Front 
2,005 0 
Rajasthan Dev Sena 
Dal 484 0 
Bharat Nirman 
Party 2,000 0 
Rashtriya Yuva Sangh 482 0 Bhartiya Jan Yug Party 2,000 0 
Rashtrawadi Samaj 
Party 450 0 
Socialist Party 
(Lohia) 1,997 0 
Loktanrik Janata Party 
(Secular) 351 
0 
 
Labour Party of 
India (V.V. Prasad) 1,993 0 
Bharatiya Grameen 
Dal 346 0 
Indian Bahujan 
Sandesh Party 
(Kanshiram) 
1,952 0 
Akhil Bhartiya Kisan 
Mazdoor Morcha 305 0 
Dr. Ambedkar 
Samajvadi 
Democratic Party 
1,949 0 
Jaganmay Nari 
Sangathan 226 0 
Adarsh 
Manavtawadi Party 1,919 0 
Grand Total 417,159,281 543 Bhartiya Navjawan 
Sena (Paksha) 1,862 0 
 Rashtriya Bahujan 
Hitay Party 1,842 0 
Narayani Sena 1,725 0 
Bahujan Suraksha 
Dal 1,723 0 
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Brihattar Bharat 
Prajatantra Sewa 
Party 
1,679 0 
Bhartiya Party 1,635 0 
Rashtriya 
Uttarakhand Party 1,629 0 
Awami Samta Party 1,617 0 
Bharatiya Rashtriya 
Mazdoor Dal 1,607 0 
All India Azaad 
Congress Party 1,593 0 
Rashtriya Manav 
Samman Party 1,572 0 
Rashtriya Janshanti 
Party 1,571 0 
All Jammu and 
Kashmir 
Republican Party 
1,568 0 
Rashtriya Janta 
Party 1,526 0 
Rashtriya 
Bandhutwa Party 1,521 0 
Jebamani Janata 1,517 0 
Loktantrik 
Rashrtavadi Party 1,491 0 
Nehru Janhit 
Congress 1,463 0 
Akhil Bharatiya 
Congress Dal 
(Ambedkar) 
1,461 0 
Navodyam Party 1,455 0 
Bhartiya Naujawan 
Inklav Party 1,440 0 
Rashtriya Vikas 
Manch Party 1,434 0 
Bhartiya Samajik 
Kranti Dal 1,423 0 
Bhrashtachar Mukti 
Morcha 1,413 0 
Bharatiya 
Navyuvak Party 1,408 0 
Punjab Labour 
Party 1,386 0 
Kamarajar Deseeya 
Congress 1,345 0 
Democratic 
Prajakranthi Party 
Secularist 
1,342 0 
Bharatiya Jawala 
Shakti Paksha 1,337 0 
Jan Raksha Party 1,318 0 
Democratic Secular 
Party 1,262 0 
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Rashtriya Komi 
Ekta Party 1,254 0 
National 
Organisation 
Congress 
1,202 0 
Rashtrawadi 
Parivartan Party 
(L.B,) 
1,195 0 
All India Mazdoor 
Party (Rangreta) 1,182 0 
National Youth 
Party 1,176 0 
Bahujan Kranti 
Party (Marxwad-
Ambedkarwad) 
1,174 0 
Bhartiya Vikas 
Party 1,152 0 
Rashtriya 
Janmorcha 1,145 0 
Bhartiya Janta Dal 
(Integrated) 1,118 0 
Rashtriya Garib Dal 1,111 0 
Indian Justice Party 1,103 0 
Bharatiya Samaj 
Dal 1,096 0 
Voters’ Party 1,089 0 
Akhil Bharatiya 
Manavata Paksha 1,077 0 
The Religion of 
Man Revolving 
Political Party of 
India 
1,071 0 
Indian Bahujan 
Samajwadi Party 1,059 0 
Rashtriya Shoshit 
Samaj Party 1,054 0 
Akhil Bhartiya 
Aamjan Party 1,040 0 
Manavadhikar 
Janshakti Party 997 0 
Himachal 
Swabhiman Party 997 0 
Majlis Markaz-e-
Siyasee Party 959 0 
Dalit Vikas Party 
(Bharat) 950 0 
Janral Samaj Party 944 0 
Shivrajya Party 944 0 
Union Party of 
India 944 0 
Aazadi Ka Antim 
Aandolan Dal 937 0 
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Rashtriya Morcha 
Party 927 0 
Bhartiya Shramik 
Dal Socialist 924 0 
Republican Party of 
India Ektavadi 910 0 
Hindustan Swaraj 
Congress Party 888 0 
Bharatiya Mool 
Niwasi Samaj Party 877 0 
Democratic 
Congress Party 833 0 
Bhartiya Chaitanya 
Party 802 0 
National Party 791 0 
Goa Su-Raj Party 783 0 
Samta Vikas Party 763 0 
Kannada Chalavali 
Vatal Paksha 707 0 
Prajatantra Aadhar 
Party 698 0 
Akhil Bharatiya 
Hind Kranti Party 685 0 
Akhil Bharatiya 
Rajarya Sabha 683 0 
Social Action Party 682 0 
Rashtriya Sawarn 
Dal 665 0 
Akhand Bharat 
Samaj Party 651 0 
Indian Oceanic 
Party 649 0 
Rashtriya Ekta 
Party 601 0 
B.C.Bharata Desam 
Party 597 0 
Hindustan Ekta 
Party 566 0 
Adarsh Samaj Party 557 0 
Indian Gandhiyan 
Party 546 0 
All India Ravidas 
Samata Party 543 0 
Uttar Pradesh 
Republican Party 542 0 
Goemcarancho 
Otrec Astro 530 0 
Bharatiya Nav 
Kranti Party 502 0 
Nava Bharat 
National Party 485 0 
Thrinamool Tamil 
Nadu Congress 474 0 
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Navbharat Nirman 
Party 441 0 
Parivartan Samaj 
Party 433 0 
Rashtriya 
Janadhikar Party 415 0 
Indians Victory 
Party 398 0 
Sardar Vallabhbhai 
Patel Party 394 0 
Ambedkar People’s 
Movement 374 0 
Majdoor Kisan 
Union Party 362 0 
Jan Samanta Party 357 0 
Vanchit Jamat Party 350 0 
People’s Party of 
India(secular) 331 0 
Bhartiya Jan Manch 325 0 
Akhil Bharatiya 
Ashok Sena 296 0 
Vishva SHakti 
Party 263 0 
Rashtriya Jatigat 
Aarakshan Virodhi 
Party 
259 0 
Rashtriya Jankranti 
Party 217 0 
Bharat Vishal Party 161 0 
Grand Total 553,801,801 543 
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D.  Pakistan177 
2008
178
 2013
179
 
PARTY VOTES SEATS PARTY VOTES SEATS 
Pakistan Peoples Party 10,664,125 93 Pakistan Muslim League (N) 14,874,104 167 
Pakistan Muslim League 7,493,711 40 
Pakistan Tehreek-e-
Insaf (Movement for 
Justice) 
7,679,954 35 
Pakistan Muslim League 
(N) 6,870,951 67 
Pakistran Peoples 
Party 
Parliamentarians 
6,911,218 29 
Independent 3,678,315 30 Independent 5,880,658 0 
Muttahida Qaumi 
Movement Pakistan 2,568,819 19 
Muttahidda Qaumi 
Movement 2,456,153 23 
Mutthida Majlis-e-Amal 
Pakistan (MMA) 817,403 5 
Jamiat Ulama-e-
Islam (F) 1,461,371 14 
Pakistan Muslim League 
(F) 684,686 4 
Pakistan Muslim 
League 1,409,905 3 
Awami National Party 669,299 10 Pakistan Muslim League (F) 1,072,846 0 
National Peoples Party 148,892 1 Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan 963,909 0 
Pakistan Peoples Party 
(Sherpao) 146,535 1 
Awami National 
Party 453,057 1 
Pakistan Democratic 
Party 84,025 0 
Mutahida Deeni 
Mahaz 360,297 0 
Balochistan National 
Party (Awami) 72,956 1 
Pukhtoonkhwa Milli 
Awami Party 214,631 0 
Sindh United Party 33,641 0 National Peoples Party 197,829 0 
People’s Party 
Parliamentarians 31,997  
Pakistan Muslim 
League (Z) 128,510 0 
National Party 27,148 0 Bahawalpur National Awami Party 113,365 0 
Pakistan Awami Party 19,248 0 
Jamiat Ulama-e-
Islam Nazryati 
Pakistan 
103,098 0 
Pakistani Peoples Party 18,456 0 Awami Muslim League Pakistan 93,046 0 
Pakistan Peoples Party 
(Shaheed Bhutto) 14,292 0 Sindh United Party 82,634 0 
Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam 
(S) 6,171 0 
Tehreek-e-Tahaffuze 
Pakistan 76,358 0 
Pakistan Citizen 
Movement 5,441 0 
Pakistan Muslim 
League (J) 71,773 0 
Pakistan Bachao Party 5,147 0 Awami Jamhuri Ittehad Pakistan 71,175 0 
Jamait Ahle-Hadith 
Pakistan (Elahi Zaheer) 4,008 0 
Jamiat Ulma-e-
Pakistan (Noorani) 67,966 0 
                                                                                                                   
 177 Data reflects votes cast in the General Elections for candidates for the Pakistani National 
Assembly. 
 178 Kollman et al., supra note 168. 
 179 Pakistan: Election for National Assembly 2013, ELECTIONGUIDE.ORG, http://www.election 
guide.org/elections/id/545/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2015). 
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Hazara Democratic 
Party 3,174 0 
Balochistan National 
Party 63,979 0 
Awami Himayat 
Tehreek pakistan 2,929 0 National Party 61,148 0 
Pasban 2,355 0 All Pakistan Muslim League 54,231 0 
Azad Pakistan Party 2,281 0 Pakistan National Muslim League 52,398 0 
Punjab National Party 2,263 0 
Pakistan Peoples 
Party (Shaheed 
Bhutto) 
50,046 0 
Jamhoori Wattan Party 2,173 0 Qaumi Watan Party (Sherpao) 46,574 0 
Sunni Tehreek 1,589 0 Tehreek-e-Suba Hazara 43,265 0 
Pakistan Muhafiz Party 1,480 0 Majlis-e-Wahdat-e-Muslimeen Pakistan 41,520 0 
Pakistan Tehrek-e-
Inqalab 1,293 0 
Sunni Ittehad 
Council 37,732 0 
Pak Muslim Alliance 874 0 Pakistan Sunni Tehreek 25,485 0 
Pakistan Aman Party 284 0 Sindh Taraqi Passand Party (STP) 23,397 0 
Pakistan Ittehad Tehreek 235 0 Qoumi Wattan Party 19,253 0 
Pakistan Gharib Party 215 0 Awami Warkers Party 18,650 0 
Markazi Jamiat Ulema-
e-Pakistan (FK) 197 0 
Balochistan National 
Party (Awami) 12,866 0 
Pakistan Qaumi Party 136 0 Hazara Democratic Party 11,052 0 
Pakistan Qaumi League 72 0 Mohajir Qaumi Movement Pakistan 10,575 0 
Pakistan Freedom Party 68 0 Jamote Qaumi Movement 10,468 0 
Mohajir Kashmir 
Movement 10 0 
Pakistan Saraiki 
Party 5,236 0 
Jamiat Ulama-e-
Pakistan (Niazi) 4 0 
Pakistan Kissan 
Ittehad 4,367 0 
Grand Total 34,086,898 271 Pakistan Falah Party 4,207 0 
 Awami Justice Party 
Pakistan 3,803 0 
Pakistan Justice Party 3,230 0 
Islami Tehreek 
Pakistan 2,694 0 
Christian Progressive 
Movement 2,523 0 
Mohib-e-Wattan 
Nowjawan Inqilabion 
Ki Anjuman 
2,503 0 
Mutahidda Qabil 
Party 2,399 0 
Qaumi Tahaffaz 
Party of Pakistan 2,202 0 
Mustaqbil Pakistan 2,052 0 
Sairkistan Qaumi 
Ittehad 1,890 0 
Seraiki Sooba 
Movement Pakistan 1,797 0 
Awami Workers 
Party 1,657 0 
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Jamhoori Wattan 
Party 1,632 0 
Karwan-i-Millat 
Pakistan 1,412 0 
Jannat Pakistan Party 1,269 0 
Tehreek Tabdili 
Nizam Pakistan 1,164 0 
Pakistan Muslim 
League (Sher-
Bangal) A.K. 
1,063 0 
Pakistan Insani 
Haqook Party 989 0 
Pakistan Patriotic 
Movement 948 0 
Pakistan Muslim 
League (Safdar) 890 0 
Markazi Jamiat 
Mushaikh Pakistan 833 0 
Pakistan 
Conservative Party 794 0 
Tehreek-e-Istehkaam 
Pakistan 651 0 
Islamice Republican 
Party 631 0 
Pakistan Tehrek-e-
Inqalab 593 0 
Tehreek-e-Ittehad 
Ummat Pakistan 583 0 
Pak Justice Party 537 0 
Pakistan Freedom 
Party 502 0 
Roshan Pakistan 
Muhaibban Wattan 
Party 
493 0 
Pakistan Muslim 
League “H” Haqiqi 472 0 
Mutahida Baloch 
Movement 471 0 
Menecracy Action 
Party of Pakistan 447 0 
Awami Himayet 
Tehreek Pakistan 330 0 
Islami Inqalab Party 274 0 
Pakistan Human 
Rights Party 266 0 
Jamiat Ulama-e-
Islam (S) 258 0 
Pakistan Gharib 
Party 256 0 
Sindh Dost Ittehad 
(SDI) Party 250 0 
Istehkaam-e-Pakistan 
Movement 240 0 
Pak Wattan Party 220 0 
Istiqal Party 218 0 
Hazara Awami 
Ittehad Pakistan 214 0 
Pakistan National 
Democratic Party 191 0 
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Communist Party of 
Pakistan 191 0 
Ghareeb Awam Party 174 0 
Pakistan Muslim 
League-Muttahida 172 0 
Pakistan Muslim 
League Council 152 0 
Afgan Qomi 
Movement (Pakistan) 152 0 
Pakistan Brohi Party 149 0 
Pakistan Muhajir 
League 134 0 
Pakistan Muhafiz 
Watan Party 126 0 
Azad Pakistan Party 116 0 
Pakistan Muslim 
League (Zehri 
Group) 
101 0 
Tehrik-e-Masawaat 99 0 
All Pakistan 
Bayrozgar Party 89 0 
Pakistan Aman Party 71 0 
Mutthida Majlis-e-
Amal Pakistan 69 0 
Pakistan Motherland 
Party 68 0 
Pakistan Muslim 
League Humkhiyal 
(Like Minded) 
64 0 
Pakistan Qaumi Party 55 0 
Pakistan Islami 
Justice Party 54 0 
Tehreek-e-Wafaq 
Pakistan 48 0 
Salam Pakistan Party 34 0 
Aap Janab Sarkar 
Party 30 0 
Jamiat Ulma-e-
Pakistan (Niazi) 27 0 
Pakistan Muhammadi 
Party 24 0 
Aalay Kulam Ullah 
Farman Rasool(saw) 15 0 
All Pakistan Youth 
Working Party 14 0 
Punjab National 
Party 13 0 
Pakistan Awami 
Quwat Party 9 0 
Pakistan Awami 
Inqalab 7 0 
Grand Total 45,388,404 272 
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E.  The United States180 
2012
181
 2014
182
 
PARTY VOTES SEATS PARTY VOTES SEATS 
Democrat 59,967,096 202 Republican 40,311,871 247 
Republican 58,523,501 233 Democrat 35,825,999 188 
Libertarian 1,346,183 0 Libertarian 873,039 0 
Independent 585,379 0 Independent 700,996 0 
No Party Affiliation 374,428 0 Conservative 259,876 0 
Green 348,549 0 Working Families 249,112 0 
Working Families 315,111 0 Green 216,435 0 
No Party Preference 281,642 0 Independence 134,109 0 
Conservative 252,956 0 Libertarian Party of Florida 61,989 0 
Independence 116,781 0 Americans Elect (Write-in) 44,924 0 
Unaffiliated 83,680 0 Constitution 37,397 0 
Reform 66,164 0 Independent Green 30,662 0 
Constitution 40,772 0 Unaffiliated 30,377 0 
Nominated by the 
Petition 30,291 0 
Independent 
American Party 29,856 0 
American Constitution 
Party 29,356 0 Pacific Green 18,969 0 
Independent American 
Party 25,185 0 Independent Party 16,750 0 
U.S. Taxpayers 22,793 0 Reform 14,897 0 
Independent Green 21,712 0 Libertarian (Write-in) 13,052 0 
Libertarian (Write-in) 16,141 0 Progressive / Pacific Green 11,163 0 
Libertarian/Pacific 
Green/Progressive 15,009 0 
Conservative / 
Libertarian 11,050 0 
Pacific 
Green/Progressive 13,159 0 U.S. Taxpayers Party 10,904 0 
Socialist Workers Party 11,834 0 Peace and Freedom 9,192 0 
Independent Party 9,710 0 D-R Party 7,007 0 
Change, Change, 
Change 7,627 0 Send Mr. Smith 4,294 0 
                                                                                                                   
 180 Data reflects votes cast in the General Elections for candidates for the House of 
Representatives.  Only seats with voting power in the legislature were considered, and thus the 
votes from American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, the Northern Mariana Islands, the U.S. 
Virgin Islands, and Washington, D.C. have all been excluded. 
 181 Federal Election Commission, Federal Elections 2012: Election Results for the U.S. 
President, the U.S. Senate, and the U.S. House of Representatives, FEC.GOV, http://www.fec. 
gov/pubrec/fe2012/federalelections2012.shtml. 
 182 Federal Election Commission, Federal Elections 2014: Election Results for the U.S. 
President, the U.S. Senate, and the U.S. House of Representatives, FEC.GOV, http://www.fec. 
gov/pubrec/fe2014/federalelections2014.shtml. 
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Pacific Green 7,516 0 Labor 4,158 0 
Americans Elect2 6,740 0 We Deserve Better 4,157 0 
Non-Affiliated 5,589 0 Allen 4 Congress 3,870 0 
Bednarski for Congress 5,154 0 José Peñalosa 3,496 0 
Conservative/Libertarian 4,853 0 Stop Boss Politics 2,781 0 
Independent Reform 
Candidate 4,520 0 For Americans 2,435 0 
Liberty Union 4,065 0 Liberty Union 2,071 0 
No Slogan 3,881 0 Energy Independence 2,024 0 
Country 3,775 0 Petitioning Candidate 1,970 0 
Opposing Congressional 
Gridlock 3,725 0 Seeking Inclusion 1,715 0 
Natural Law Party 3,251 0 Natural Law Party 1,680 0 
We the People 2,771 0 Legalize Marijuana Party 1,330 0 
Petitioning Candidate 2,290 0 Bullying Breaks Hearts 1,237 0 
Legalize Marijuana 
Party 1,956 0 
Politicians are 
Crooks 1,192 0 
Politicians are Crooks 1,841 0 Change is Needed 1,103 0 
Restoring America’s 
Promise 1,710 0 Wake Up USA 1,022 0 
Unity Is Strength 1,625 0 Future Vision 998 0 
Constitutional 
Conservative 1,329 0 911 Truth Needed 653 0 
Truth Vision Hope 1,285 0 Of the People 634 0 
Vote KISS 1,153 0 Truth Vision Hope 567 0 
Abundant America2 1,138 0 Flourish Every Person 554 0 
Bob’s For Jobs 1,104 0 Start the Conversation 531 0 
The People’s Agenda 1,010 0 American Labor Party 501 0 
Conservative, 
Compassionate, Creative 892 0 
Republican (Write-
in) 153 0 
Overthrow All 
Incumbents 868 0 Democrat (Write-in) 16 0 
Tax Revolt 711 0 Grand Total 78,964,768 435 
None of Them 530 0  
 
 
 
No Slogan Filed 280 0 
Republican (Write-in) 2 0 
Grand Total 122,580,623 4350 
 
 
